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This thesis focuses on international claims for return of corporeal movable cultural heritage 
and the problems potential claimants face when seeking return of their heritage, particularly 
when resort is had to the traditional rules of private international law. It examines the 
difficulty of defining cultural heritage within a proprietary context and looks to the principle 
of legal personhood as an alternative way to govern claims for return. To draw inspiration, 
it examines the attribution of personhood to environmental objects, and looks to Bumper 
Development Corporation v The Metropolitan Police and Ors ([1991] 1 WLR 1362) in terms 
of what attribution of personhood might mean for extraterritorial recognition in the context 
of private international law. While the force of attributing legal personhood to objects of 
cultural heritage is largely rhetorical, it helps to change domestic attitudes surrounding the 
protection of cultural heritage. In particular, viewing cultural heritage through the lens of 
personhood, as not mere property but a type of ‘quasi-person,’ justifies an analogy to the 
successful return mechanism, the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction. The Convention is examined as it might influence claims for 
return of objects of cultural heritage. The thesis proposes suggestions for an improved 
cultural heritage return mechanism. 
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‘Cultural heritage’ encompasses a wide variety of art, artifacts, and monuments, as well as 
rituals, traditional skills, and other aspects of intangible heritage.1 To many, objects of 
cultural heritage hold meaning beyond mere property. For example, the president of the 
Council of Elders of Rapa Nui (Easter Island) stated regarding the four-ton lava rock 
sculpture, Hoa Hakananai’a, at the British Museum, ‘This is no rock. It embodies the spirit 
of an ancestor, almost like a grandfather. This is what we want returned to our island – not 
just a statue.’2  
 
Increasingly, the view is that cultural heritage is worthy of special protection, not only for 
the objects themselves, but for the communities to whom they are important.3 This is 
demonstrated, for example, by increased ratification over the last decades of international 
instruments designed to prevent illicit trade of cultural property and facilitate returns.4 
However, for several reasons many potential claimants are unable to demand return of their 
heritage under these instruments. In international disputes, resort is often had to the rules of 
private international law,5 in which cultural heritage is typically reduced to ordinary items 
of movable property. Given a recent surge in looting, trafficking, and illicit online sales,6 




1 This thesis will only cover corporeal movable objects. 
2John Bartlett, ‘Easter Islanders call for return of statue from British Museum’ (The Guardian, 4 June 2019) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2019/jun/04/easter-islanders-call-for-return-of-statue-from-british-
museum> accessed 28 March 2021. 
3 Protection of cultural heritage is increasingly seen as fundamental to the protection of human rights (UNGA 
Cultural rights and the protection of cultural heritage, Resolution (Human Rights Council 22 March 2018) 
(A/HRC/RES/37/17)). 
4 E.g., 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property. 
5 While alternative dispute resolution has become increasingly common, private international litigation 
remains important for resolving cultural heritage disputes (Irini Stamatoudi, 'Alternative Dispute Resolution 
and Insights on Cases of Greek Cultural Property' (2016) 23(4) International Journal of Cultural Property 
433).  
6 Tom Mashberg, ‘Facebook, Citing Looting Concerns, Bans Historical Artifact Sales’ (NYTimes, 23 June 
2020) <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/23/arts/design/facebook-looting-artifacts-ban.html> accessed 28 
March 2021. 
7 Agnès Bardon, ‘Art Traffickers: Pillaging peoples’ identities’ (2020) The UNESCO Courier 50 Years of the 
Fight Against the Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Goods 5, 5. 
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 This thesis explores means of improving upon the rules applicable to private international 
return claims for cultural heritage. Chapter One discusses the issues of scope and 
terminology pertaining to cultural heritage and their returns, particularly ‘cultural property’ 
and why that term is inappropriate. 
 
Chapter Two looks at the law which currently applies to return claims for cultural heritage. 
It examines both the applicable international instruments and their return mechanisms, as 
well as the residual rules of private international law applicable to cultural heritage return 
claims. It explores why these rules fall short; predominantly, the treatment of cultural 
heritage as ordinary corporeal movable property governed by the rules applicable to normal 
proprietary transactions.  
 
In order to examine cultural heritage disputes outside of a proprietary framework, Chapter 
Three explores the idea of attributing legal personhood to objects of cultural heritage. This 
may be seen as giving a voice to the objects themselves, as well as to communities in their 
claims for return that might otherwise be barred due to lack of standing. The chapter 
examines potential consequences that flow from this attribution. It looks to examples in 
environmental law and examines how legal personhood might apply to objects of cultural 
heritage. It examines Bumper Development Corporation v Commissioner of Police of the 
Metropolis 8 in detail regarding extraterritorial recognition of foreign legal personality, and 
it explores the potential use of a personal law connecting factor in this context. The chapter 
determines ultimately that the force of attributing personhood to inanimate objects is largely 
rhetorical. For the purposes of private international law, however, conceiving objects of 
cultural heritage through this lens - a type of quasi-personhood - allows an analogy to be 
drawn to the treatment of children under the law. Specifically, the analogy justifies looking 
to the very successful return mechanism in the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects 
of International Child Abduction.9 
 
Chapter Four examines the 1980 Hague Convention and the ways in which it might 
influence the drafting of new rules for return mechanisms that might better apply to cultural 
heritage than those currently in use. It provides a reimagining of rules for a return mechanism 
for cultural heritage. This thesis provides a different perspective through which cultural 
heritage might be evaluated. 
 
 
8 [1991] 1 WLR 1362. 
9 HCCH, 25 October 1980. 







Cultural heritage law is complex, and its discourse is complicated by terminology, including 
the definition and scope of cultural heritage itself. Language is reflective of societal values 
and social constructs, and its use is important in framing cultural heritage laws and 
disputes.10 For example, a property-oriented framework produces specific consequences and 
remedies, while a human rights-based approach will likely result in others. Cultural heritage 
law and discourse are evolving concepts that vary depending upon the approach taken, 
applicable laws and international instruments, and the outcomes desired.11 It is therefore 
useful to examine what constitutes ‘culture,’ ‘cultural property,’ and ‘cultural heritage,’ as 
well as the significant terms ‘repatriation,’ ‘restitution,’ and ‘return.’  
 
1.2 Defining Cultural Heritage – A Framework 
 
Traditionally, cultural heritage has been ‘a realm of vivid contrasts and wildly conflicting 
ideals,’12 and language describing cultural heritage is reflective of this.13 For example, there 
is the traditional divide between so-called ‘market states’ - nations where cultural heritage 
enters the international art market, such as the United States and the United Kingdom- and 
‘source states’ - those rich in cultural materials, often subjects of looting and trafficking 
fuelled by international demand, such as Greece and Italy, Syria and Iraq.14 Dichotomies 
such as these provide a framework within which cultural heritage law is discussed and 
practiced.  
 
To frame cultural heritage arguments, Sherry Hutt proposed six (sometimes overlapping) 
theoretical approaches: moralist, property law, scientific, market, nationalist, and 
 
10 Karen Warren, ‘A Philosophical Perspective on the Ethics and Resolution of Cultural Property Issues’ in 
Phyllis Messenger (ed), The Ethics of Collecting Cultural Property (2nd Edn University of New Mexico Press 
1999)14; Christa Roodt, Private International Law, Art and Cultural Heritage (Edward Elgar 2015) 6. 
11 Irini Stamatoudi, Cultural Property law and Restitution: A Commentary to International Conventions and 
European Union Law (Edward Elgar 2011) 4. 
12 Norman Palmer, ‘Recovering Stolen Art’ in Kathryn Tubb (ed), Antiquities Trade or Betrayed: Legal, 
Ethical and Conservation Issues (Archetype 1995) 27.  
13 James Nafziger, The Cultural Heritage of Mankind (Martinus Nijhoff 2008) 200. 
14 John Henry Merryman, 'The Nation and the Object’ (1994) 3(1) The International Journal of Cultural 
Property 61; SRM Mackenzie, Going, Going Gone: Regulating the Market in Illicit Antiquities (Institute of 
Art and Law 2005) 8-9. 
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 internationalist theories.15 The cultural nationalist and internationalist approaches, terms 
coined by John Henry Merryman, an outspoken proponent of cultural internationalism,16  are 
the most polarized. Cultural nationalism emphasizes preservation of cultural heritage within 
state boundaries, and is said to be supported by international cultural heritage instruments 
containing return mechanisms for states to claim their national cultural heritage.17 
Conversely, cultural internationalists stress that cultural heritage be conserved, yet widely 
accessible as a ‘global public good.’18 Merryman posited that cultural internationalists take 
an object-oriented approach as opposed to a nation-centered one,19 and regard the nationalist 
perspective as politically motivated, producing extreme ‘nationalist retentionist’ laws, such 
as blanket state ownership legislation for undiscovered archaeological finds and strict export 
restrictions.20  
 
While these theories may be useful to understand the basic context within which cultural 
heritage disputes operate, particularly when dealing with jurisdictions with sharply 
contrasting domestic cultural heritage laws, they can be abstract, reductive, and 
adversarial.21 However, they are reflective of the frameworks that influence judicial 
reasoning and domestic and international legal instruments designed to protect cultural 
heritage. 
 
1.2.1 What Counts as Cultural Heritage? 
 
Cultural heritage engages diverse parties with varying interests and may encompass a wide 
array of objects. Objects deemed worthy of protection (whether internationally, nationally, 
within communities, or organizations) and how that protection is enacted legally (ratification 
of international instruments, existence of bilateral agreements, national legislation, 
professional codes of ethics, etc), differs greatly between jurisdictions. Therefore, defining 
 
15 Sherry Hutt, ‘Cultural Property Law Theory: A Comparative Assessment of Contemporary Thought’ in 
Jennifer Richman and Marion Forsyth (eds), Legal Perspectives on Cultural Resources (Altamira Press 
2004) 17-36. 
16 John Henry Merryman, ‘Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property’ (1986) 80(4) American Journal 
of International Law 831; Merryman 1994 (n14). 
17 E.g., 1970 UNESCO ‘incumbent upon every State to protect the cultural property existing within its 
territory’ (Preamble). Lorna E Gillies, ‘The Contribution of Jurisdiction as a Technique of Demand Side 
Regulation in Claims for the Recovery of Cultural Objects’ (2015) 11(2) Journal of Private International 
Law 295, 300. 
18 ‘Global public good,’ referring to fundamental international values superior to individual states’ interests 
(Alessandro Chechi, ‘The 2013 Judgment of the ICJ in the Temple of Vihear Case and the Protection of 
World Cultural Heritage Sites in Wartime’ (2015) 6(2) Asian Journal of International Law 353, 354). 
19 Merryman 1994 (n14). 
20 James Cuno, Who Owns Antiquity? (Princeton University Press 2008) 124; Merryman 1986 (n16) 847. 
21 Nafziger (n13) 200. 
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 cultural heritage and objects which may be characterized as such is ‘one of the most delicate 
[questions] to resolve.’22 Texts often use terms to define cultural heritage interchangeably 
and there is no universally accepted definition of cultural heritage in international 
instruments.23 Classification of objects is often left to the contracting state parties.24 Defining 
what may be considered cultural heritage is important, for omission of objects means that 
they might not be protected by specific regimes, particularly if under dispute in a forum that 
does not recognize an object’s cultural significance. This is especially a concern with objects 
significant to indigenous and other minority cultures.25  
 
Given the range of interests and complexity of cultural heritage disputes, it is useful to 
examine more closely the core concepts of cultural heritage law discourse: culture, cultural 




Characterizing an object or a practice as ‘cultural’ involves a value judgement.26 It elevates 
an ordinary object to something significant, worthy of protection and preservation.27  
UNESCO defines culture as ‘the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and 
emotional features of society or a social group, and that it encompasses, in addition to art 
and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs.’28 
Culture may be reflected in, e.g., religion, laws, folklore, as well as the material culture, 
from, art to everyday items.29 Culture influences a society’s way of life and the materials 
they produce. Culture represents identity, and the products reflecting that culture can be 
emotionally connected to a community as part of their identity. This may be seen in the 
reaction of states or communities when demanding return of their heritage. 
 
 
22 Marina Schneider, ‘1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen and Illegally Exported Cultural Objects: 
Explanatory Report’ (2001) 3 Uniform Law Review 476, 496. 
23 James Nafziger and Robert Kirkwood Paterson ‘Cultural Heritage Law’ in Nafziger and Kirkwood 
Paterson (eds) Handbook on the Law of Cultural Heritage and International Trade (Edward Elgar 2014) 1; 
Lyndel V Prott, ‘The International Movement of Cultural Objects’ (2005) 12(2) International Journal of 
Cultural Property 225; Stamatoudi (n11) 4. 
24 1970 UNESCO Art 1; Directive 2014/60/EU Art 1(1). 
25 Roodt (n10) 6. 
26 Schneider (n22) 496; Christa Roodt and David Carey-Miller, ‘Stolen Cultural Property: Implications of 
Vitium Reale in Private Law and Private International Law’ (2013) 10(5) Transnational Dispute 
Management 1. 
27 Defining culture this way might also be particularly Western. (James Clifford, The Predicament of 
Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art (Harvard University Press 1988) 215-248); 
Richard Handler, ‘Cultural Property and Culture Theory’ (2003) 3(3) Journal of Social Archaeology 353, 
359. 
28 2001 UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, 2 November 2001, (47 ILM 57), Preamble. 
29 Nafziger (n13) 179-180; Roodt (n10) 2-5. 
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 Parthenon Marbles 
 
Consider the paradigmatic example of the Parthenon Marbles30 residing in the British 
Museum since 1816. Greece has long demanded their return, maintaining that they are part 
of their identity. Melina Mercouri, former Greek Minister of Culture and Sports stated: “You 
must understand what the Parthenon Marbles mean to us. They are our pride. They are our 
sacrifices. They are our noblest symbol of excellence. They are a tribute to the democratic 
philosophy. They are our aspirations and our name. They are the essence of Greekness.”31  
At the same time, it is argued that they have been implicitly adopted by the English, 
becoming part of its cultural heritage, not only because they have resided in London for 
‘longer than the modern state of Greece has been in existence,’32 but also due to their 
influence on British culture.33 As Merryman wrote, ‘The Elgin Marbles and other works in 
the British Museum have entered British culture, help define the British to themselves, 
inspire British arts, give Britons identity and community, civilize and enrich British life, and 
stimulate British scholarship.’34 
 
At what point can it be said that something has become part of a nation’s cultural heritage? 
Regardless of legality, does Greece have a better claim to the Parthenon Marbles as part of 





It is particularly difficult to reconcile claims made by modern nations for return of objects 
produced by ancient cultures markedly different than their own. This is especially true when 
modern borders do not correspond with the ancient civilization. Consider the Sevso (Seuso) 
Treasure, a hoard of fourth-century CE Roman silver illegally excavated from an unknown 
find spot, now believed to be Hungary.35 It was purchased by the Marquess of Northampton 
in 1984 in Switzerland (following a failed sale to the Getty Museum due to forged export 
 
30 It is worth noting opinions regarding language used: ‘the term Elgin Marbles has the effect of ceding 
legitimacy to British seizure’ (Rosemary Coombe, ‘The Properties of Culture and the Politics of Possessing 
Identity’ (1993) 6(2) Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 249, 263).  
31 Melina Mercouri, Speech to the Oxford Union, June 1986 
<http://www.parthenon.newmentor.net/speech.htm >accessed 02 April 2021. 
32 Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport, Minutes of Evidence, Annex IV: The Parthenon Sculptures 
(March 2000) 10.4. 
33 Nadia Banteka, ‘The Parthenon Marbles Revisited: A New Strategy for Greece’ (2016) 4(37) University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 1231, 1240. 
34 John Henry Merryman, ‘Thinking About the Elgin Marbles’ (1985) 83 Michigan Law Review 1881, 1915. 
35 Patty Gerstenblith, ‘The meaning of 1970 for the acquisition of archaeological objects’ (2013) 38 Journal 
of Field Archaeology 364, 372. 
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 documents). In 1990 the Marquess consigned the silver to Sotheby’s and the hoard was 
shipped to New York for sale. To ensure that it was not stolen or illegally exported, 
Sotheby’s notified all 29 nations within the borders of the Roman Empire in the fourth-
century.36 Subsequently, Lebanon, Hungary, and the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, 
whose claim was replaced by Croatia following the fall of Yugoslavia, claimed the Treasure 
as their own. Ultimately, following withdrawal of Lebanon’s claim and rejection of those by 
Hungary and Croatia, the Sevso Treasure was returned to the Marquess in London. Years 
later, Hungary purchased the hoard in two private sales in 2014 and 2017 for 15 million and 
28 million euros respectively. Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán thereafter stated that 
“Hungary’s family silver is coming home.”37 This case illustrates the difficulty of attributing 
cultural continuity and any sort of claim of belonging over objects made by markedly 
different ancient cultures based solely on modern day boundaries ‘of origin.’   
 
The reactions from government officials regarding the Parthenon Marbles and the Sevso 
Treasure illustrate how cultural heritage transcends ordinary property and represents cultural 
identity. Their intrinsic worth, while often of extreme monetary value, transcends economic 
value. They are ‘the outcome of human creativity and express meanings distinct from the 
commercial value that they may possess’38 and have attained a special status inseparable 
from a group’s identity.39 The Parthenon Marbles and the Sevso Treasure also emphasize 
that culture is fluid; geographical boundaries change, people and their creations move around 
the world, influence and are influenced by each other. While cultural heritage is 
representative of identity, one that may be felt deeply and emotionally, it may be a direct or 




States with original, cultural, historical, or archaeological links are given so-called 
‘preferential rights’ for preservation and disposal of cultural heritage in the context of the 
law of the sea, where state boundaries may be irrelevant for objects found in international 
waters (and thus beyond the limits of national jurisdiction). The UN Convention on the Law 
 
36 Republic of Lebanon v Sotheby’s, the Trustee of the Marquess of Northampton Settlement, and the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 167 AD.2d 142, 561 NYS.2d 566 (NY S.Ct 1990). 
37 David Landry, ‘Sevso Treasure,“Hungary’s family silverware,” returned (Budapest Business Journal 26 
March 2014) <https://bbj.hu/budapest/sevso-treasure-hungarys-family-silverware-returned_77609> accessed 
28 March 2021). 
38 Alessandro Chechi, The Settlement of International Cultural Heritage Disputes (Oxford University Press 
2014) 11. 
39 Patty Gerstenblith, ‘Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural Property in the United 
States’ (1995) 75 Boston University Law Review 559, 569-570. 
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 of the Sea states that, ‘all objects of an archaeological and historical nature found in the Area 
[international waters] shall be preserved or disposed of for the benefit of mankind as a whole, 
particular regard being paid to the preferential rights of the State or country of origin, or the 
State of cultural origin, or the State of historical and archaeological origin.’40 Similarly, the 
2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage frequently 
mentions the inclusion of states with ‘a verifiable link [to the cultural heritage], especially a 
cultural, historical or archaeological link.’41 However, enforcement of these ‘preferential 
rights’ raises complications, as no clarification is given where multiple claims arise.42 
Consider the Spanish warship sunk in 1804, Nuestra Señora de las Mercedes. A US 
company discovered the wreck, excavating a hoard of artifacts and gold and silver coins. It 
transported the treasure to the US and filed suit claiming its seizure.43 Spain subsequently 
filed claim, asserting Spanish origin of the ship. Peru claimed ownership of the treasure, 
asserting that it had originated from its territory and formed part of its cultural patrimony. 
Peru argued that the case did not concern sovereign rights to the ship, but rather entitlement 
to heritage culturally and physically originating in Peru. Bolivia also inquired about 
identifying the treasure’s origin. In the end, the court granted Spain’s motion to vacate arrest 
of the Mercedes and the treasure was transported to Spain.44  
 
1.2.3 Cultural Property 
 
The term ‘cultural property,’ a term used frequently in legal discourse, is incongruous with 
the definition of culture as identity, as it emphasizes a narrow, Western legal conception of 
ownership.45 The term first appeared in English in an international legal context in the 1954 
Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.46 
It is derived from long-established civil law language, for example, biens culturels in French 
and beni culturali in Italian.47 ‘Cultural property’ is used in the 1970 UNESCO Convention 
 
40 (10 December 1982) 1833 UNTS 397, Art 149. 
41 Arts 6(2), 7(3), 9(5), 11(4)-(5), 18(3)-(4); Andrzej Jakubowski, State Succession in Cultural Property 
(Oxford University Press 2015) 253-254, 317-318. 
42 Jakubowski (n41) 253-254, 312-318. 
43 Odyssey Marine Exploration Inc v the Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel, 675 F.Supp. 2d 1126 (M.D. Fla. 
2009) (proceedings in rem under US admiralty law). 
44 Based on Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 28 USCA §1602 and principle of comity of nations (Odyssey 
Marine Exploration Inc v the Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel, 675 F.Supp. 2d 1126 (M.D. Fla. 2009)); 
Jakubowski (n41) 312-318; Patrizia Vigni,‘The Enforcement of Underwater Cultural Heritage by Courts’ in 
Francesco Francioni and Ana Vrdoljak (eds) Enforcing International Cultural Heritage Law (Oxford 
University Press 2013) 128-133. 
45 Chechi (n38) 14-15.  
46 (14 May 1954) 249 UNTS 240, Art 1. 
47 Lyndel V Prott and Patrick J O’Keefe, ‘‘Cultural Heritage’ or ‘Cultural Property’?’ (1992) 1(2) 
International Journal of Cultural Property 307, 312; Manilo Frigo ‘Cultural property v cultural heritage, A 
“battle of concepts” in international law?’ (2004) 86(854) International Review of the Red Cross 367, 367. 
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 on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of 
Ownership of Cultural Property, which defines it as ‘property which, on religious or secular 
grounds, is specifically designated by each State as being of importance for archaeology, 
prehistory, history, literature, art or science’ that belong to a wide range of categories, from 
natural specimens to art and archaeology.48  
 
‘Cultural property’ is rooted in Western legal tradition, one that prioritizes property 
ownership49 and ‘commercial convenience.’50 It is reflective of Western-European history 
of colonialism and collecting, rooted in power structures that prioritize certain cultures over 
others. Property connotes ownership and the associated Western legal rights, such as 
destruction or restricted access to property,51 concepts that may be unfamiliar or have 
different meanings in other legal systems when relating to cultural heritage.  
 
Margaret Radin’s theory of property and personhood is useful as means of understanding 
this relationship. She posits that certain property is so closely bound with personhood that it 
is constitutive of individual identity, and as a result deserves greater protection and is above 
commodification.52 She explained that the significance of a personal relationship with an 
object could be gauged by the pain that it would cause the person if it were lost.53 However, 
Radin’s theory is centered around the idea of individual personhood, which does not 
adequately describe the relationship that some communities have to their heritage. She 
touches on claims from minority groups, but still based on the idea of individual autonomy: 
‘their claims would seem stronger because more clearly necessary to their being able to 
constitute themselves as a group and hence as persons within that group.’54 Joseph Sax called 
for recognition of a type of qualified ownership based upon a community’s ‘rightful stake’ 
in certain important objects. This would limit the rights of private owners to, as the title of 
his book suggests, ‘play darts with a Rembrandt.’55 
 
 
48 1970 UNESCO Art 1(a)-(k). 
49 Nafziger and Paterson (n23) 1; Prott and O’Keefe (n47) 310. 
50 Winkworth v Christie, Manson & Woods, Ltd [1980] Ch.496, 512-513 per Slade J. 
51 Joseph L Sax, Playing Darts with a Rembrandt: Public and Private Rights in Cultural Treasures 
(University of Michigan Press 1999). 
52 Margaret Jane Radin, 'Property and Personhood' (1982) 34(5) Stanford Law Review 957; Kristen A 
Carpenter, Sonia Katyal and Angela Riley, ‘In Defense of Property’ (2009) 118(6) Yale Law Journal 1022, 
1046-1048. 
53 Radin (n52) 959. 
54 Radin (n52) 1013; Carpenter, Katyal and Riley (n52) 1048. 
55 Sax (n51). 
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 Some cultures may not have a concept of property or ownership at all.56 Some communities 
view cultural objects as animate entities engaging with the community, which ‘throws the 
legal and mechanistic narratives on restitution into disarray […]. It forces confrontation on 
the reality that the terms of our intellectual engagement come from a specific historically 
and politically situated discourse with a dominant version of Western Modernity.’57  
 
Consider certain ritual objects believed to embody divine spirits, that belong to but are not 
owned by their communities, such as ahayu:da, statues representing personified gods of the 
Zuni Pueblo58 or katsinam, sacred masks embodying ancestral spirits of the Hopi Tribe.59 
Another example is Maori taonga, objects that, translated roughly into English, can mean 
property, anything highly valued, and/or something of influence. They are considered to be 
the ancestors themselves.60 ‘Cultural property’ with its connotations of ownership is simply 
incompatible with such beliefs.61   
 
1.2.4 Cultural Heritage 
 
As means of accounting for these differences and avoiding possible misinterpretations of the 
meaning of property, it is argued that ‘cultural heritage’ be used in lieu of ‘cultural property.’ 
It is the preferred term in other cultural heritage disciplines, such as archaeology and 
anthropology,62 and it has been used in post-1970 UNESCO conventions, such as the 2001 
Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage and the 2003 Convention for 
the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage. The shift in terminology denotes a shift 
away from the narrow treatment of cultural heritage as simple corporeal property.  
 
‘Heritage’ connotes lineage, something passed down or inherited. ‘Cultural heritage’ 
encompasses the objectives at the heart of international cultural heritage law in a way that 
 
56 Prott and O’Keefe referenced Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141, and the Yolngu people’s 
conception of ownership: ‘rather than believing that the land belonged to them, they believed that they 
belonged to the land.’ (Prott and O’Keefe (n47) 310). 
57 Yannis Hamilakis, ‘A Semiotics of Cultural Property Argument’ (2007) 14(2) International Journal of 
Cultural Property 160, 162. 
58 Adele Merenstein, ‘The Zuni Quest for Repatriation of the War Gods’ (1992) 17(2) American Indian Law 
Review 589. 
59 Jonathan Liljeblad, ‘The Hopi, the katsinam, and the French courts: looking outside the law in the 
repatriation of Indigenous Cultural heritage’ (2016) International Journal of Heritage Studies 1. 
60 AH Angelo, ‘Personality and Legal Culture’ (1996) 26(2) Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 
395, 396. 
61 ‘Cultural objects’ is used Directive 2014/60/EU and 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally 
Exported Cultural Objects. While an object implies something to be owned, the subject of ownership, 
‘cultural objects’ is relatively more neutral than ‘cultural property.’ 
62 Prott and O’Keefe (n47) 310, 319. 
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 ‘cultural property’ does not. For example, those of preservation, protection and access, 63 as 
well as cultural diversity and pluralism.64 For these reasons, ‘cultural heritage’ or ‘cultural 
objects,’ as opposed to ‘cultural property,’ will be used throughout when referring to the 
subjects of this thesis, notably corporeal movables.  
 
In the end, coming to a precise and internationally accepted definition of what cultural 
heritage entails is likely impossible65 given the enormity of objects and the diversity of 
parties and their varied interests. What is common is the importance of the material. 
Regardless of the term employed, the cultural significance of an object is clear and self-
explanatory, particularly when an object of cultural heritage, and thus its importance, is 
under dispute.  
 
1.3 Repatriation, Restitution, Return 
 
‘Repatriation,’ ‘restitution,’ and ‘return’ are at the heart of cultural heritage disputes.66 While 
used interchangeably in practice, they apply to different factual situations and may have 




‘Repatriation’ denotes the restoration of cultural heritage to its country of origin. It is rooted 
in the notion of belonging to a place or a people.67 Contrary to its literal meaning, 
‘repatriation’ may apply to intra-state claims, particularly the return of human remains and 
cultural objects to indigenous communities.68 As Lyndel Prott observed, “There are special 
resonances turning around ‘repatriation’ or ‘return to country’ in the Indigenous context. 
[…] embodiment of identity, people and belief brought together in the idea of ‘country.’ 
Here the relationship to ‘Country’ is by no means a term of property, ownership, civil law 
or citizenry.”69 In general, ‘repatriation’ signifies cultural integrity as opposed to ownership 
rights. 
 
63 Prott and O’Keefe (n47) 310. 
64 2001 UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity. 
65 Beat Schönenberger, The Restitution of Cultural Assets (Eleven International 2009) 40; Roodt (n10) 5. 
66 Also ‘reparation,’ but typically regarding redress for victims after damage to cultural heritage in war/other 
conflicts; Prosecutor v Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Reparations Order (17 Aug 2017). Al Mahdi charged 
with war crime of destruction of protected cultural heritage sites in Timbuktu. Reparations ordered for 
economic and moral losses, individually and collectively, to the community (Oumar Ba, ‘Who are the 
Victims of Crimes Against Cultural Heritage? (2019) 41(3) Human Rights Quarterly 578). 
67 Stamatoudi (n11) 14-17. 
68 E.g., Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (25 USC Ch32 §3001). 
69 Lyndel V Prott, ‘Note on Terminology’ in Lyndel V Prott (ed), Witness to History (UNESCO 2009) xxiii. 




‘Restitution’ is a legal term in civil and common law systems. As a specific remedy, it entails 
the defendant giving back something that has been taken from the claimant. The defendant’s 
gain reflects the claimant’s loss, and a court redresses this. Generally, the remedy of 
restitution aims to restore a party to their original position and provide reparation for injury. 
For cultural heritage, this could mean return of an object to its original holder, and/or, 
depending on the legal system, compensation.70 ‘Restitution’ presumes a lack of 
authorisation and is associated with ownership in many jurisdictions. Historically 
‘restitution’ was used for cultural heritage pillaged in war, and came to include the 
restoration of both wartime plunder and objects removed during colonialism.71  However, 
former colonizing States ‘were very sensitive to the vigorous criticism of colonization’ and 
‘uncomfortable with any implication that the cultural items being sought from their museums 
had been stolen or that their taking was an injury for which reparation was due.’72 Pushback 
against its use in colonial contexts was supported by the argument that removals complied 
with existing international law and domestic legislation.73 The strictly legal connotation of 
‘restitution’ has diminished in modern cultural heritage law.74 It is posited that ‘restitution’ 
should not apply in cultural heritage law as a term “of ‘ownership’ but as one of justice; not 
as a matter of legality, but as one of legitimacy.”75 ‘Restitution’ connotes giving back what 




‘Return’ has become an autonomous term,76 preferred over ‘restitution’ for heritage removed 
during colonialization, and in this context the illegality of removal is not implied.77 ‘Return’ 
is frequently used in international cultural heritage instruments.78 Returns made under these 
 
70 Prott 2009 (n69) xxi; Stamatoudi (n11) 15-16. 
71 E.g., UNGA Restitution of works of art to countries victims of expropriation, 18 December 1973 
(A/RES/3187) (referring to restitution of objects removed ‘as a result of colonial or foreign occupation’); 
Wojciech Kowalski, ‘Types of Claims for Recovery of Lost Cultural Property’ (2005) 57(4) Museum 
International 85, 85-96. 
72 Prott 2009 (n69) xxi-xxii. 
73 Kowalski (n71) 96-97. 
74 Stamatoudi (n11) 15-16. 
75 Prott 2009 (n69) xxi. 
76 Kowalski (n71) 96. 
77 Marie Cornu and Marc-André Renold, ‘New Developments in the Restitution of Cultural Property: 
Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution’ (2010) 17(1) International Journal of Cultural Property 1, 3. 
78 1970 UNESCO 7(b)(ii); 2014/60/EU on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the 
territory of a Member State. The terms ‘return’ (stolen cultural objects) and ‘restitution’ (illegally exported 
objects) are separate in 1995 UNIDROIT Convention. 
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 instruments are based on illegality, however, in general ‘return’ is a fairly impartial term,79 
‘not generally associated with the rectification of a ‘wrong’ or the amendment of an 
‘injury.’’80 Given its relative neutrality and the variety of cases cited, the term ‘return’ will 




To recap, this thesis will use the terms ‘cultural heritage’ and ‘return’ throughout. The idea 
of cultural heritage is geographically and culturally diverse. Nuance and sensitivity must be 
had not only in the manner in which objects of heritage are used, preserved, and studied, but 
should also be reflected in the ways in which disputes over such heritage are handled. As 




79 Prott 2009 (n69) xxi. 




2 The Law Pertaining to International Claims for Return 
 
 
2.1 International Cultural Heritage Rules  
 
Special rules for protection, preservation, and recovery of cultural heritage are contained in 
several international instruments.81 The primary instruments facilitating return of objects of 
cultural heritage will be discussed briefly below, namely the 1970 UNESCO Convention on 
the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership 
of Cultural Property,82 the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on stolen or illegally exported 
cultural objects,83 and Directive 2014/60/EU on the return of cultural objects unlawfully 
removed from the territory of a Member State,84 as well as the First Protocol of the 1954 
Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.85 
 
2.1.1 First Protocol 1954 Hague Convention 
 
An early return mechanism was introduced by the First Protocol to the 1954 Hague 
Convention following the destruction of cultural heritage during World War II.86 It requires 
contracting states to prevent exportation of cultural heritage from any territory under its 
occupation.87 States must seize objects imported directly or indirectly from occupied 
territories, automatically or on request from the occupied territory, regardless of a 
possessor’s good faith. They must return them to authorities in the former occupied territory 
at the close of hostilities.88 No time limitations are specified. The occupying state shall pay 
an indemnity to holders in good faith of cultural property returned,89 however, no guidance 





81 Smaller-scale agreements also exist, such as bilateral agreements. 
82 (14 November 1970) 823 UNTS 231. 
83 (24 June 1995) 34 ILM 1322. 
84 Directive 2014/60/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 and amending 
Regulation (EU) No.1024/2012 (Recast) OJ L159/1. 
85 (14 May 1954) 249 UNTS 358. 
86 It was not intended as a separate document, but states opposed seizure/return provisions (i.e., private law 
aspects) in Convention’s main text. (Patrick J O’Keefe and Lyndel V Prott, Cultural Heritage Conventions 
and Other Instruments: A Compendium with Commentaries (Institute of Art and Law 2011) 35). 
87 First Protocol I(1). 
88 Ibid, I(2)-(3). 
89 Ibid, I(4); Lyndel V Prott, ‘UNESCO and UNIDROIT: A Partnership against Trafficking in Cultural 
Objects’ (1996) 1(1) Uniform Law Review 59, 67. 
90 O’Keefe and Prott (n86) 36. 
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While the First Protocol was an important early instrument acknowledging the need to return 
objects looted during occupation, it is rarely used. Its scope is narrow, as the law of 
occupation only applies to international armed conflict.91 Not all states involved in potential 
export-seizure-return relationships will necessarily be contracting parties, thus obtaining 
returns might be difficult.92 Additionally, many states do not have implementing legislation 
to address situations in which domestic property and ownership laws conflict with First 
Protocol provisions, which has prevented states from fulfilling return obligations.93 
Reservations regarding seizure and return94 are also allowed, which may permit states to 
prioritize domestic law over First Protocol provisions.95 Lastly, private owners of any 
cultural heritage removed during armed conflict would require state support to request return 
of their cultural heritage. 
 
2.1.2 1970 UNESCO Convention 
 
The 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit 
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property established a framework for 
state collaboration in preventing and recovering unlawfully removed cultural heritage.96 The 
Convention has been highly influential. It has inspired adoption of domestic cultural heritage 
laws,97 and highlighted the problems caused by illicit trade and the consequences to global 
cultural heritage. It marked a normative shift in the ethics of collecting.98 Following its 
adoption on 14 November 1970, major museum associations, such the International Council 
of Museums (ICOM), implemented codes of ethics reflecting the Convention’s principles.99 
The 1970 UNESCO Convention marked a ‘watershed in museum attitudes and practice, 
separating off the years before 1970, when the problems caused by illicit trade were either 
 
91 Liesbeth Lijnzaad, ‘Sleeping Beauty, the Untold Story of the First Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention’ 
in van Woudenberg and Lijnzaad (eds), Protecting Cultural Property in Armed Conflict (Martinus Nijhoff 
2010) 148. 
92 Currently 133 state parties to the Convention; 110 to the First Protocol. 
<http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/armed-conflict-and-heritage/convention-and-
protocols/states-parties/>accessed 01 February 2021; Lijnzaad (n91) 150. 
93 Greek Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Cyprus v Lans (Court of Rotterdam, 4 Feb 1999), in S Matyk, 
‘The Cypriot Icons in The Netherlands (Lans Case)’ in Lyndel V Prott (ed), Witness to History (UNESCO 
2009) 386-387.  
94 First Protocol I-II. 
95 See Japan’s reservations in O’Keefe and Prott (n86) 37. 
96 Christa Roodt, Private International Law, Art and Cultural Heritage (Edward Elgar 2015) 123. 
97 Some specifically implementing the Convention (Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act 19 
USC§§2601-13), others based on the Convention (Dealing in Cultural Objects (Offences) Act 2003) (Patty 
Gerstenblith, ‘Implementation of the 1970 UNESCO Convention by the US and other Market Nations’ in 
Jane Anderson and Haidy Geismar (eds) Routledge Companion to Cultural Property (Routledge 2017). 
98 Roodt (n96) 134. 
99 ‘cultural institutions, museums […] should ensure that their collections are built up in accordance with 
universally recognized moral principles’ (1970 UNESCO Preamble). 
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not widely known or thought to be unimportant, from the time afterwards, when the 
problems became better known and of mounting concern in the museum world.’100 
  
Article 7(b)(ii) of the 1970 UNESCO Convention provides for return of stolen cultural 
objects specifically designated by each state.101 Returns are limited to ‘clear and 
egregious’102 cases, specifically, documented objects stolen from museums, public 
monuments, or similar institutions.103 Return requests may be brought by contracting state 
parties through diplomatic offices.104 Where a return is ordered, the requesting state must 
pay ‘just compensation’ to an innocent purchaser (not defined), or one with valid title to the 
object.105 While the Convention contains no rule for time limitations for claims, state parties, 
in implementing the Convention, may apply their national rules.106 All documentation and 
evidentiary expenses, as well as return and delivery costs, are the responsibility of the 
requesting state.107 (Which, in litigation would be borne by the losing party.)  
 
While the 1970 UNESCO Convention is influential and relatively widely adopted,108 its 
return provision is limited. The scope of objects covered is narrow, excluding unregistered, 
illicitly excavated, or illegally exported objects. Claims for return depend on contracting 
state intervention, leaving no recourse for private parties without state support, particularly 
if claimants are seeking return of non-state-designated cultural objects.  
 
2.1.3 1995 UNIDROIT Convention 
 
The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on stolen or illegally exported cultural objects 
complements and is compatible with the 1970 UNESCO Convention. At UNESCO’s behest, 
UNIDROIT drafted rules to govern the private law issues relating to transfers of illegally 
acquired objects not addressed in the UNESCO Convention.109 The 1995 UNIDROIT 
 
100 Neil Brodie, ‘Provenance and Price: Autoregulation of the Antiquities Market?’ (2014) 20(4) European 
Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 427, 440. 
101 And meeting Art 1 criteria. 
102 Paul M Bator, ‘An Essay on the International Art Trade’ (1982) 34(2) Stanford Law Review 275, 354; 
Isabelle Gazzini, Cultural Property Disputes: The Role of Arbitration in Resolving Non-Contractual 
Disputes (Transnational Publishers 2004) 19-20. 
103 1970 UNESCO Art 7(b)(i)-(ii). 
104 Ibid, Art 7(b)(ii). 
105 Ibid. Some states made reservations to Art 7(b)(ii) regarding the payment of compensation (Declarations 
and Reservations). 
106 Prott 1996 (n89) 66. 
107 1970 UNESCO Art 7(b)(ii). 
108 Currently ratified by 140 state parties <https://en.unesco.org/fighttrafficking/1970> accessed 01 April 
2021. 
109 Prott 1996 (n89) 61. 
2 Law Pertaining to Claims for Return 28 
Convention is centered around the return of stolen and illegally exported cultural objects.110 
It is the only international heritage instrument that covers private civil claims for return,111 
providing a mechanism for personal right of recovery without state intervention.  
 
Claims may be brought before the courts of the contracting state where a cultural object112 
is located (or others with jurisdiction according to the laws of the applicable contracting 
states).113 Stolen objects, which includes those unlawfully excavated,114 must be returned.115 
For illegally exported objects, a contracting state may request an object’s return116 on the 
condition that its removal significantly impairs, inter alia,117 the object’s physical 
preservation,118 its traditional or ritual use by a tribal or indigenous community,119 or it is 
established to be of significant cultural importance to the requesting state.120 There are two 
periods in which claims must be brought, one relative and one absolute. The relative period 
asserts that claims must be brought within three years of discovery of an object’s location 
and identity of its possessor. 121 This rule was seen as being in the best interest of the 
claimant.122  The absolute limit is within fifty years from the time of the theft, 123 which was 
designed to safeguard the rights of the possessor.124  For certain stolen objects, there is an 
exceptional period in which states may allow a time limitation of 75 years ‘or such longer 
period as is provided in its law.’125 The Convention applies from the date of entry into force 
in the state where a claim is brought,126 however it does not limit the right to make a claim 
under remedies outside the framework of the Convention.127  
 
 
110 Roodt (n96) 231-232; Marina Schneider, ‘The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention: An indispensable 
complement to the 1970 UNESCO Convention and an Inspiration for the 2014/60/EU Directive’ (2016) 2 
Santander Art & Culture Law Review 149. 
111 Lorna E Gillies, ‘The Contribution of Jurisdiction as a Technique of Demand Side Regulation in Claims 
for the Recovery of Cultural Objects’ (2015) 11(2) Journal of Private International Law 295, 297. 
112 A wide range of categories of objects are covered by the Annex. 
113 1995 UNIDROIT Art 8(1). 
114 Ibid, Art 3(2), according to the law of the state where the excavation took place. 
115 Ibid, Art 3(1). 
116 Ibid, Arts 5(2), 6(3)(a) (State may agree that possessor retains object instead of compensation). 
117 Ibid, Art 5(3). 
118 Ibid, Art 5(3)(a). 
119 Ibid, Art 5(3)(d). 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid, Art 3(3), 5(5). 
122 Marina Schneider, ‘1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen and Illegally Exported Cultural Objects: 
Explanatory Report’ (2001) 3 Uniform Law Review 476, 508. 
123 1995 UNIDROIT Arts 3(3); 5(5). 
124 Schneider 2001 (n122) 508. 
125 1995 UNIDROIT Art 3(3).  
126 Ibid, Art 10(1). 
127 Ibid, Art 10(3). 
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Possessors of objects to be returned are entitled to fair and reasonable compensation 
provided they exercised due diligence.128 That is, they ‘neither knew nor ought reasonably 
to have known’ of the object’s wrongful removal and can prove due diligence in acquisition 
of the object. Regard will be had to all circumstances surrounding acquisition.129 The due 
diligence requirement in Article 4 has the effect of limiting protections afforded to good 
faith possessors in civil legal systems. (See 2.2.4.1 below regarding good faith possession.) 
The Convention’s due diligence standard, ‘a benchmark for the evaluation of due 
diligence,’130 has been influential beyond the rules of the Convention.131 
 
The Convention specifies that reasonable efforts must be made to hold the transferor(s) of 
stolen objects accountable for compensation if consistent with the law of the forum state.132 
Otherwise, the dispossessed owner or the requesting state is responsible for compensation.133  
 
While the ‘genuine restitution machinery’134 of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention is 
commendable, it has limitations. Most significantly is its lack of application due to limited 
ratification. The Convention’s prohibition on reservations, requirement of compensation, 
wide scope of heritage covered, and the length of time limitations and ‘the limited factors 
which trigger them’ have been cited as reasons against accession.135  Notably, the UK 
deemed limitation periods ‘the greatest barrier to the adoption of the UNIDROIT 
Convention.’136 The limitation periods were seen as too generous for potential claimants, 
particularly those who ‘fail[ed] to take obvious and reasonable steps’137 to discover an 
object’s location and identity of the possessor, to the detriment of possessors who had 
exercised due diligence in acquisition.138  
 
 
128 Ibid, Arts 4(1), 6(1). 
129 Ibid, Arts 4(4), 6(2).  
130 Schneider 2016 (n110) 157. 
131 For example, it is included in the domestic legislation of some signatory states that have not ratified the 
Convention, such as Switzerland (Swiss Federal Act on the International Transfer of Cultural Property of 20 
June 2003, Art 16) and the Netherlands (Dutch Civil Code, Art 3:87a) (Schneider 2016 (n110) 157). 
132 1995 UNIDROIT Art 4(2). 
133 Ibid, Art 6(4). 
134 European Commission Study on preventing and fighting illicit trafficking in cultural goods in the EU 
(October 2011) CECOJI-CNRS-UMR 6224, 203. 
135 Ministerial Advisory Panel on Illicit Trade (ITAP) Report December 2000, Department for Culture Media 
and Sport 49, 48-53; Lyndel V Prott, ‘The Unidroit Convention Ten Years On’ (2009) Uniform Law Review 
215, 222. 
136 ITAP Report 50. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid, 49-53. 
2 Law Pertaining to Claims for Return 30 
The failure of many states to accede, particularly ‘market/import’ states such as the UK and 
the US, is attributed to heavy opposition from the art trade.139 Furthermore, several signatory 
states have failed to ratify the Convention, such as France, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and 
Russia.140 While their domestic laws may meet or exceed the Convention’s requirements, 
such as that of due diligence, for example, through alignment with relevant EU legislation 
(particularly Directive 2014/60/EU, as discussed in 2.1.4 below), or other domestic 
legislation (as discussed at n131 above), it is still notable that the Convention has not been 
ratified.141 These factors greatly limit the Convention’s reach and applicability. While its 
rules were carefully drafted, taking into account numerous interests and balancing the needs 
of claimants and possessors, its impact as a viable return mechanism remains limited.  
 
2.1.4 Directive 2014/60/EU 
 
The 1995 UNIDROIT convention influenced the ‘so-called Return Directive,’142 Directive 
2014/60/EU on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a 
Member State.143 It functions in combination with Council Regulation (EC)116/2009 on the 
export of cultural goods144 and Regulation (EU) 2019/880 on the introduction and the import 
of cultural goods.145 The Directive provides a system of administrative cooperation between 
EU Member States, working closely with institutions such as Interpol,146 allowing them to 
bring proceedings before national courts for return of cultural objects unlawfully removed 
from their territories. The Directive’s objective is to ensure return of such objects to Member 
States irrespective of property rights.147  
 
 
139 Prott 2009 (n135) 231. 
140 50 contracting state parties <https://www.unidroit.org/status-cp>(accessed 02 April 2021). 
141 For example, the 2018 Sarr-Savoy Report on the restitution of African cultural heritage encourages 
France’s ratification of the UNIDROIT Convention to address inconsistencies in restitution claims between 
EU and non-EU states: ‘The compensation for this imbalance and the writing of a common law of restitution 
between France and Africa requires that both the (sic) France and the African states concerned ratify the 
UNIDROIT Convention […] This convention puts in place an automatic mechanism of restitution for any 
future claims. […] We will note that the European states have already established such an ambition among 
themselves by infusing the principles of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention into the European directive of 
May 15, 2014 [Directive 2014/60/EU] […] the extension of these principles to extra-European states, using 
the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention as a springboard, shouldn’t pose any difficulties.’ (Felwine Sarr and 
Bénédicte Savoy, Rapport sur la restitution du patrimoine culturel africain. Vers une nouvelle éthique 
relationnelle. (Ministère de la culture, Drew S Burk (tr) 2018) 85). 
142 R (on the application of Simonis) v Arts Council England [2020] 3 CMLR 22 [48]. 
143 Prott 2009 (n135) 223.  
144 Council Regulation (EC) No 116/2009 of 18 Dec 2008 on the export of cultural goods OJ L 39/1. 
145 Regulation (EU) 2019/880 on the Introduction and import of cultural goods [2019] OJ L151/1. 
146 Directive 2014/60/EU Preamble (8). 
147 Ibid. 
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Directive 2014/60/EU recast Council Directive 93/7/EEC,148 under which proceedings could 
be brought by Member States for return of national treasures149 (belonging to categories in 
its Annex meeting specific age and financial thresholds) unlawfully removed from their 
territory on or after 1 January 1993.150 However, after nearly two decades, Council Directive 
93/7/EEC proved ineffective.151 Member States reported lack of use due to restrictive scope 
of objects, short limitation period, and high costs associated with proceedings.152 
Nevertheless, they reported that the Council Directive had a preventative effect against 
unlawful removals, and that it was a ‘useful tool for the recovery of certain cultural objects 
removed unlawfully from the territory of a Member State, and for protecting heritage.’153 
While return proceedings were rare, amicable out of court returns increased after its entry 
into force.154 In the UK, for example, regarding the Directive’s implementing instrument,155 
‘[i]n the 24 years since this regulation was introduced, the powers have not needed to be 
used – all concluded cases involving the UK have been resolved without the need to revert 
to national or EU courts.’156   
 
Directive 2014/60/EU was drafted with the above criticism in mind. The Council of the 
European Union recommended universal ratification of the 1970 UNESCO and 1995 
UNIDROIT Conventions to complement the Directive, but this was ultimately 
abandoned.157 However, encouraged by Member State demand to extend the limitation 
period,158 Directive 2014/60/EU aligned with the UNIDROIT Convention and extended it 
from one year to three years following date of discovery, maintaining the thirty-year period 
 
148 Council Directive 93/7/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from 
the territory of a Member State [1993] OJ L 74/74. 
149 Within the meaning of Art 36 (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2016] OJ C202/1). 
Derogation from the principle of free movement of goods between Member States. (93/7/EEC Art 1). 
150 Directive 93/7/EEC Art 13.  
151 Schneider 2016 (n110) 160; Third (COM/2009/0408) and Fourth Reports (COM/2013/0310) on the 
application of Council Directive 93/7/EEC. 
152 Directive 2014/60/EU Preamble (4), (8); Maciej Górka,‘Directive 2014/60/EU: A New Legal Framework 
for Ensuring the Return of Cultural Objects within the European Union’ (2016) 2 Santander Art & Culture 
Law Review 27, 29. 
153 Third Report 93/7/EEC, 5. 
154 Geo Magri, ‘Directive 2014/60/EU and Its Effects on the European Art Market.’ (2016) 2 Santander Art 
& Culture Law Review 195, 202. Member States reported ‘148 actual returns of cultural objects following 
negotiations between the national authorities, without recourse to the courts’ (Third Report 93/7/EEC, 4.2; 
Annex), and 22 amicable out of court settlements (Fourth Report (Annex)). 
155 The Return of Cultural Objects Regulations 1994 (SI 1994/501) amended by Return of Cultural Objects 
(Amendment) Regulations 2015 (SI 2015/1926); The Return of Cultural Objects (Revocation) (EU Exit) 
(Amendment) Regulations 2020. 
156 Explanatory Memorandum, The Return of Cultural Objects (Revocation) Regulations 2018 (No.1086), 
7.3. 
157 2014/60/EU Preamble (16); Tamás Szabados, ‘In Search of the Holy Grail of the Conflict of Laws of 
Cultural Property: Recent Trends in European Private International Law Codifications’ (2020) 27(3) 
International Journal of Cultural Property 323, 325-326. 
158 Schneider 2016 (n110) 160. 
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after illicit export and 75 years for certain objects.159 The Annex and financial/age thresholds 
were eliminated, expanding the scope to all objects classified as national treasures by 
Member States.160 In terms of compensation, allocation of burden of proof for exercise of 
due diligence was reversed from Council Directive 93/7/EEC and placed upon the possessor. 
‘Due care and attention’ was defined, copying the text of the UNIDROIT Convention almost 
exactly.161 However, Directive 2014/60/EU applies the criteria uniformly to both stolen and 
illegally exported objects, whereas the UNIDROIT Convention’s due diligence criteria 
applies to stolen objects only.162 The spirit of Directive 93/7/EEC was carried over, that is, 
‘to ensure the physical return of the cultural objects to the Member State from whose territory 
those objects have been unlawfully removed, irrespective of the property rights applying to 
such objects.’163 Article 13 specifies that ‘[o]wnership of the cultural object after return shall 
be governed by the law of the requesting Member State.’164  
 
It is hard to judge the impact of Directive 2014/60/EU on the number of returns to Member 
States. As prescribed by the Directive, Member States were to submit reports to the 
Commission reviewing its application by 18 December 2020, and every 5 years thereafter.165 
As of date of writing, the final report has not been released. However, taking the deficiencies 
of Directive 93/7/EEC into account, Directive 2014/60/EU has hopefully provided an 
accessible return mechanism permitting Member States to quickly recover national treasures 
from other Member States. By allowing Member States to certify what they consider to be 
national treasures, the Directive removes the risk that the state assessing summary return 
does not recognize the special nature of the object and block its return.166 Any ownership 
disputes are to be determined by authorities in the Member State to which an object holds 
particular significance. This will hopefully allow for appropriate, culturally sensitive rulings. 
While it is positive that objects covered by the Directive are designated by Member States, 
there is the possibility that certain heritage will not be included, such as those significant to 
indigenous groups or other communities that a Member State does not recognize as national 
treasures or are not protected by national laws. However, as with the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention, standing is an issue, as an individual or community seeking return of an object 
requires State intervention in order to raise a claim. The scope of the Directive is limited in 
 
159 Directive 2014/60/EU Art 8(1). 
160 Ibid, Arts 1, 2(1). 
161 Ibid, Art 10; Magri (n154) 203.  
162 UNIDROIT Convention Art 4(4); Schneider 2016 (n110) 160. 
163 Directive 2014/60/EU Preamble (8). 
164 Ibid, Art 13. 
165 Ibid, Art 17(2); Corrigendum to Directive 2014/60/EU L 147/24. 
166 E.g., Roodt (n96) 82-83. 
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that it only applies to Member States, and objects must also be located in another Member 
State to qualify for return under the Directive. Lastly, its non-retroactivity and limitation 
periods might not allow for older, more ambiguous claims. 
 
 
2.2 The Rules of Private International Law 
 
When the aforementioned international instruments do not apply to international claims for 
return, resort is likely had to the ‘residual’ rules of private international law. Cultural heritage 
disputes engage the rules of private international law when they involve a private claim with 
a foreign legal element. These rules determine which court is competent to adjudicate a claim 
and which body of law should govern the dispute.167  However, the rules of private 
international law are not universal, comprising separate systems of rules developed by state 
and national courts and legislatures. While there is a move towards harmonization,168 no set 
of rules is universally recognized.169  Civil return claims for objects by original ‘owners’ of 
cultural heritage are, for the most part, governed by these ordinary, yet complex, rules of 
private international law. 
 
Private international disputes involve the establishment of jurisdiction, characterization of 
the nature of the dispute, allocation of the legal system to be applied to the dispute, and 




Return claims are typically adjudicated where the object is located,170 as ‘adjudication and 
enforcement are more certain when the decision can be rendered by that court with physical 
control over the object.’171  For example, under the Brussels I Recast, civil claims for return 
from EU Member States ‘based on ownership’ may be brought ‘in the courts for the place 
where the cultural object is situated at the time the court is seized.’172 The Brussels I Recast 
no longer applies to civil and commercial proceedings in the UK commenced after the end 
 
167 Generally, Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws, Lord Collins of Mapesbury and ors (eds) 
(15th edn Sweet & Maxwell 2012) Chapter 1; Cheshire, North & Fawcett Private International Law, Paul 
Torremans (ed) (15th edn Oxford University Press 2017) Chapter 1; Elizabeth B Crawford and Janeen M 
Carruthers, International Private Law: A Scots perspective (4th Edn W Green 2015). 
168 E.g., development of Conventions in EU law. 
169 Cheshire (n167) 8. 
170 Sometimes where defendant is domiciled, e.g., Brussels I Recast, Art 4(1), although these will typically 
coincide. 
171 Roodt (n96) 80-81.  
172 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast)) OJ 
L351/1, Art 7(4). 
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of the Brexit implementation period, 31 December 2020. Currently, jurisdiction is generally 
where the defendant is present or domiciled.173  
 
The lex fori (law of the forum) applies to all procedural matters, and the lex causae (the law 
applicable to the action, be it the law of the forum or foreign law) applies to matters of 
substance.174  The distinction is not always obvious and may vary according to the forum.175 
Jurisdictional differences regarding cultural heritage disputes are apparent the moment a 
claim is lodged, as the rules of the forum decide which matters are classified as substantive 
or procedural.  The forum may also determine issues such as the requirement of due 
diligence,176 burden of proof,177 the use of a public policy exception, and the type of remedy 
available.178 These procedural differences between jurisdictions may be of great 
consequence to parties claiming return of an object.179   
 
A court may decline or be barred from ruling on the merits of a case. There are certain 
instances in which claims for return may not be admissible by a court under private 




Standing to sue is typically a procedural matter.180 Claimants must be recognized as proper 
juristic entities with legal interest in a claim. However, these requirements may present 
difficulties for parties seeking return of cultural heritage in foreign jurisdictions. In certain 
instances, such as with indigenous groups, this is particularly difficult as they may lack 
standing domestically,181 preventing the bringing of claims in domestic and foreign 
forums.182  Where a foreign entity is recognized in their home state, the judge of a foreign 
forum may still deny standing. For example, French courts held that the Native American 
Hopi tribe lacked standing to halt the sale of their katsinam (see Chapter 1, 1.2.3) 
 
173 Scotland: Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 Sch.8; England: Maharanee Seethadevi Gaekwar of 
Baroda v Wildenstein [1972] 1 QB 283. 
174 Dicey (n167) Rule 19. 
175 Cheshire (n167) 73-76, 86; Janeen M Carruthers ‘Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws: A 
Continuing Debate in Relation to Damages’ (2004) 53(3) International Comparative Law Quarterly 691. 
176 Roodt (n96) 96-98. 
177 Dicey (n167) 7-034. 
178 Ibid, 7-011. 
179 Roodt (n96) 80-98. 
180 Cheshire (n167) 86-87; Dicey (n167) Rule 19(2). 
181 Native American tribal standing was once contested. Federally recognized tribes now have capacity of 
sovereign entities under federal law. (Richard Collins, ‘To Sue and Be Sued: Capacity and Immunity of 
American Indian Nations’ (2018) 51 Creighton Law Review 391, 424.) 
182 Lyndel V Prott, ‘Problems of Private International Law for the Protection of the Cultural Heritage’ (1989) 
217 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 214, 246-249; Dicey (n167) 7-017. 
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notwithstanding its federal recognition in the US.183 This is not always the case. In Bumper 
Development Corp v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis184 an Indian temple was 
permitted standing to sue in English courts even though it was not a legal person under 
English law. 
 
2.2.1.2 State Immunity 
 
States and their property may be immune from suit in foreign courts under the doctrine of 
state immunity.185 International law provides the framework186 but it may be applied as 
matter of domestic law.187  State immunity was absolute, but there is a trend towards 
exceptions to immunity in many states, typically those arising from jure gestionis, private 
acts such as commercial transactions (as opposed to jure imperii, by virtue of sovereign 
authority).188  
 
Consider Barnet v Ministry of Culture & Sports of the Hellenic Republic.189 In 2018, Greece 
emailed Sotheby’s a letter demanding return of an ancient bronze horse set to be auctioned, 
claiming ownership and illegal removal. Sotheby’s and the consignor, the Barnet Trust, 
sought declaratory judgment of ownership and ability to sell the bronze. Greece filed motion 
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to state immunity, citing plaintiffs’ 
failure to satisfy any exceptions under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).190 The 
district court denied Greece’s motion, holding that sending a letter asserting ownership of 
items at auction was commercial activity with direct effect in the US, included under FSIA’s 
commercial activity exception.191 However, the appellate court reversed the decision with 
instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the letter invoked Greece’s 
 
183 TGI Paris, interim orders 12 April 2013, RG n°13/25880; 6 December 2013, RG n°13/59110; 27 June 
2014, RG n°14/55733 (Laetitia Nicolazzi, Alessandro Chechi, Marc-André Renold, ‘Case Hopi Masks’ Art-
Law Centre University of Geneva <https://plone.unige.ch/art-adr/cases-affaires/hopi-masks-2013-hopi-tribe-
v-neret-minet-and-estimations-ventes-aux-encheres>accessed 01 April 2021.) 
184 [1991] 1 WLR 1362, [1991] 4 All E.R. 638; See Chapter 3, 3.2. 
185 Cf (1) foreign act of state doctrine (principle in English/US law): courts will not adjudicate on another 
state’s acts committed within its territory; (2) non-justiciability, which may be raised preliminarily, but 
(being fact-specific) may be impossible to determine until after trial (H. Fox ‘International Law and the 
Restraints on the Exercise of Jurisdiction by National Courts of States’ in Dixon, McCorquodale, Williams 
(eds) Cases and Materials on International Law (6th edn Oxford University Press 2016) 317). 
186 Principle of customary international law; codified in UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of 
States and their Property 2004 (resolution 59/38 (A/59/49)). 
187 E.g., UK State Immunity Act 1978 (to meet obligations under European Convention on State Immunity 
ETS No.074 1972). 
188 Federal Republic of Germany v Philipp 141 S.Ct.703 (2021) [7]; Atty-Gen of New Zealand v Ortiz [1984] 
AC 1. 
189 Barnet v Ministry of Culture & Sports of the Hellenic Republic 391 F.Supp.3d 291(SDNY 2019); 961 
F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2020).  
190 28 USC §§1602-1611. 
191 Barnet 391 F.Supp.3d 291 (SDNY 2019), 299-230; (FSIA §1605(a)(2)). 
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patrimony law, which stated that movable ancient monuments belonged to Greece. The 
nationalizing of property was a distinctly sovereign rather than commercial act.192  
 
Another recent example is Federal Republic of Germany v Philipp.193 The heirs of art firms 
owned by Jewish residents of Germany filed suit against Germany in US District Court 
(D.C.) for a collection of medieval relics, the Welfenschatz, alleging its 1935 sale to Prussia 
at approximately one-third value was coerced. Germany moved to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction under state immunity. It asserted that the claim fell outside FSIA’s expropriation 
exception,194 which revokes immunity for rights in property taken in violation of 
international law. Germany claimed a sovereign’s taking of its own nationals’ property was 
not unlawful. The heirs countered that the purchase was an act of genocide violating 
international human rights law. The district court denied Germany’s motion to dismiss;195 
the appellate court affirmed.196 The Supreme Court considered whether FSIA’s 
expropriation exception allowed jurisdiction for claims that a foreign state violated 
international human rights law by expropriating from its nationals within its borders. Chief 
Justice Roberts held, ‘We need not decide whether the sale of the consortium’s property was 
an act of genocide, because the expropriation exception is best read as referencing the 
international law of expropriation rather than of human rights. We do not look to the law of 
genocide to determine if we have jurisdiction over the heirs’ common law property claims. 
We look to the law of property.’197 FSIA’s expropriation exception includes the ‘domestic 
takings rule,’ which recognizes that a foreign sovereign’s taking of its nationals’ property 
does not violate international law, and therefore Germany had immunity. 
 
 
2.2.2 Public and Penal laws  
 
The distinction between private and sovereign acts of state also applies regarding 
immunity from enforcement of foreign state acts and laws. Returns based on enforcement 
of foreign public or penal laws, such as export laws, may preclude cases from being 
adjudicated.198 In Attorney-General of New Zealand v Ortiz,199 New Zealand brought a 
claim in England against Swiss collector George Ortiz to recover an illegally exported 
 
192 Barnet 961 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2020) 201. 
193 Federal Republic of Germany, et al v Philipp, et al 141 S.Ct.703 (2021). 
194 USC §1605(a)(3). 
195 Philipp 248 F.Supp.3d 59 (DDC 2017). 
196 Philipp 894 F.3d 406 (DC Cir.2018). 
197 Philipp 141 S.Ct.703 (2021) [712]. 
198 Dicey (n167) Rule 3(1); Iran v Barakat [2007] EWCA Civ 1374 [2009] Q.B. 22. 
199 Attorney-General of New Zealand v Ortiz [1982] QB 349; [1984] AC 1. 
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Maori carving. New Zealand asserted ownership under its 1962 Historic Articles Act, 
which stipulated that historic articles exported in breach of the Act be forfeited to the 
Crown.200 At first instance, Staughton J. held that title passed to New Zealand 
automatically upon illicit export; that the law was not penal; and there was no residual 
category of unenforceable ‘other public laws,’ such as export laws. The Court of Appeal 
reversed the decision. Title did not pass automatically without seizure in New Zealand. 
Lord Denning stated that the export statute, as public law, was unenforceable and, in obiter 
comments, that no state had sovereignty beyond its borders. Thus, the English court could 
not adjudicate claims to enforce foreign penal, revenue laws or other public laws, 
distinguishing between acts jure imperii and jure gestionis.201 The House of Lords 
affirmed the decision regarding title and made no comments on enforceability. It should be 
noted that a recurrence of a case such as Ortiz would be unlikely due to legislative reform 
in New Zealand, particularly the enactment of the Protected Objects Amendment Act 
2006.202  
 
A distinction must be drawn between non-enforceable public laws and patrimonial laws 
vesting ownership in the state, as the latter may have extraterritorial application.203 In Islamic 
Republic of Iran v Barakat Galleries Ltd204 the Court of Appeal addressed whether an Iranian 
law, declaring unauthorized excavations unlawful, was a penal or public law, under which 
Iran could not raise a claim in England. The court determined on preliminary matters that 
Iran could sue under that law for return based on a patrimonial claim of ownership. They 
approved Lord Denning’s test for ‘other public laws,’ establishing that English courts will 
not enforce claims based on foreign public law concerning the enforcement of sovereign acts 
or rights (unless it would be contrary to public policy to preclude it),205 such as export laws206 
and those which authorize governmental interference with private property, such as 
confiscation or nationalization.207 This suggests that the general trend will be in favor of 
enforcing foreign cultural heritage laws.  
 
200 1962 Historic Articles Act, Art 2(2). 
201 Atty-Gen of New Zealand v Ortiz [1984] A.C. 1 [20-21]; Patty Gerstenblith, ‘Schultz and Barakat: 
Universal Recognition of National Ownership of Antiquities’ (2009) 14(1) Art Antiquity and Law 21, 33-34. 
202 It fulfils New Zealand’s obligations under the 1970 UNESCO and 1995 UNIDROIT Conventions and, 
among other protective measures, prohibits export of protected New Zealand objects without approval 
(Protected Objects Amendment Act 2006); Piers Davies and Paul Myburgh, ‘The Protected Objects Act in 
New Zealand: Too Little, Too Late?’ (2008) 15(3) International Journal of Cultural Property 321. 
203 Alessandro Chechi, ‘When Private International Law Meets Cultural Heritage’ (2017/2018) 19 Yearbook 
of Private International Law 269.  
204 Iran v Barakat [2007] EWCA Civ 1374: [2009] QB 22. 
205 Barakat [2009] QB 22 [114]- [154]; Dicey (n167) 5-038. 
206 Italy (King of) v Marquis Cosimo de Medici Tornaquinci (1918) 34 TLR 623. 
207 Princess Paley Olga v Weisz [1929] 1 KB 718. 
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Similar enforcement of foreign patrimonial laws was decided in United States v Schultz,208 
a criminal conviction of conspiring to deal Egyptian artifacts under the National Stolen 
Property Act (NSPA).209 Per the McClain doctrine,210 the government may impose criminal 
penalties under the NSPA if cultural objects have been unlawfully removed from a state with 
clear laws vesting state ownership of undiscovered heritage effective at time of removal. 
This has the effect of recognizing foreign patrimonial rights in the context of criminal 
proceedings ‘even where the State never had possession.’211 Violations under NSPA also 
permit the government to bring in rem actions against stolen objects for their recovery.212 
 
It should be noted that national export laws are recognized and enforceable between EU 
Member States under Directive 2014/60/EU,213 and the introduction/importation of 
unlawfully exported cultural goods from third countries (non-EU) is prohibited under 
Regulation (EU) 2019/880.214 Additionally, courts in states party to the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention must order the return of illegally exported cultural objects.215  
 
2.2.3 Characterization  
 
Once jurisdiction is established, substantive questions are determined by the lex causae.216 
To identify it, the forum first must characterize, or classify, the dispute according to the basis 
of the claim and the facts. Characterization determines the cause of action and a connecting 
factor links a person, object, event, or transaction to the legal system and its rules that will 
determine the dispute. 
 
 
208 US v Schultz 333 F.3d 393 (2d Cir.2003). 
209 18 U.S.C. §2311, 2314-2315; Gerstenblith 2009 (n201) 28.  
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211 Barakat [2007] EWCA Civ 1374 [150]. (Application of this principle discussed in Barakat at [163]) 
212 Proceedings in rem (civil recovery/forfeiture actions) are raised by the state on behalf of an original 
owner, often another state, as means of effecting return of its property. Criminal charges/convictions are not 
required, only that the object was involved in a crime warranting forfeiture. See, e.g., Proceeds of Crime Act 
2002; US v 10th-Century Cambodian Sandstone Sculpture 12-cv-2600-GBD (SDNY 2013); Stefan D 
Cassella, ‘Recovering Stolen Art and Antiquities Under the Forfeiture Laws’ (2020) 45 North Carolina 
Journal of International Law and Commerce Regulation 393; European Commission, Analysis of Non-
Conviction Based Confiscation Measures in the EU (12 April 2019). 
213 Directive 2014/60/EU Art 1 (return of national treasures unlawfully removed from territory of a Member 
State); Art 2(2)(a) (unlawful removal is one in breach of a Member State’s rules or of Regulation (EC) No 
116/2009 [on the export of cultural goods]). 
214 Regulation (EU) 2019/880 on the Introduction and import of cultural goods Art 3(1). 
215 1995 UNIDROIT Art 5. 
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Property is characterized as movable (corporeal or incorporeal) or immovable according to 
the lex situs, the law of the place the property is located.217 The transfer of cultural heritage, 
and its ongoing transport and maintenance, may be characterized as, e.g., contractual;218 
however, claims for return and declarations of ownership are typically characterized as 
proprietary matters. If there are contractual and proprietary consequences applicable to a 
transfer a distinction must be drawn, for different rules apply in private international law.219 
As most cultural heritage claims for return are characterized as proprietary disputes over 
movables, this will be the focus of the following sections. 
 
2.2.4 Connecting Factor and Choice of Law 
 
Once the cause of action has been characterized, the proper connecting factor must be 
selected to determine the choice of law applicable to the dispute. A connecting factor does 
not decide the outcome of a case but connects the dispute to the appropriate body of law.220  
 
The lex loci rei sitae, or lex situs, is a well-established and frequently applied rule in disputes 
concerning movable property, and, consequently, of conflict of law disputes over cultural 
heritage. The law of the place where the cultural heritage was situated at the time of alleged 
transfer governs whether valid title was transferred and its associated proprietary rights and 
responsibilities.221   
 
The forum usually applies the domestic law of the situs. It may consider its conflicts rules, 
as detailed by the doctrine of renvoi (to send back), an infrequently applied choice of law.222 
This arose in Islamic Republic of Iran v Denyse Berend223 concerning ownership of an 
ancient limestone fragment purchased in New York in good faith by Denyse Berend. Per 
French domestic law, Berend obtained title upon delivery in France. She consigned the 
fragment for auction in London. Iran brought an action in England to recover the fragment 
as part of a national monument, asserting its illegal removal. Iran argued that renvoi was 
 
217 Cf Iran v Berend [2007] EWHC 132 (QB): parties agreed fragment was movable, instead of determination 
by lex situs; (Lyndel V Prott, ‘Movables and Immovables as Viewed by the Law’ (1992) 1(2) International 
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218 Jeanneret v Vichey 541 F.Supp.80 (SDNY 1982); 639 F.2d 259 (2d Cir.1982). 
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applicable and that French conflicts rules would apply the lex origins, Iranian law, for 
cultural heritage. Eady J. reasoned that application of renvoi is ‘largely a question of 
policy.’224 He added, ‘I can think of a number of reasons why it might be desirable to apply 
generally, in dealing with national treasures or monuments, the law of the state of origin but 
that is a matter for governments to determine and implement if they see fit…I hold that, as 
a matter of English law, there is no good reason to introduce the doctrine of renvoi and that 
title to the fragment should thus be determined in accordance with French domestic law.’225  
Given its criticisms, inter alia, giving too much deference to foreign legal experts and the 
possibility of endless circular reasoning, application of renvoi is rare.226 
 
There are instances in which the lex situs is not considered the most appropriate law and 
might be set aside. These were detailed by Slade J. in Winkworth v Christie, Manson and 
Woods Ltd:227  
First, ‘‘if goods in transit and their situs is casual or not known, a 
transferer which is valid and effective by its proper law will (semble) be 
valid and effective in England.’228 The second exception… arises where 
a purchaser claiming title has not acted bona fide.229 The third exception 
is the case where the English court declines to recognise the particular 
law of the relevant situs because it considers it contrary to English public 
policy.230 The fourth exception arises where a statute in force in the 
country which is the forum in which the case is heard obliges the court to 
apply the law of its own country… Fifthly…special rules might apply to 
determine the relevant law governing the effect of general assignments 
of movables on bankruptcy or succession.’231 
Winkworth and its application of the lex situs will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
2.2.4.1 Applying the Lex Situs 
 
In order to determine the lex situs, the forum must pinpoint the location of the relevant 
transfer. This is not always easy, as journeys of cultural heritage may be long, with objects 
 
224 Ibid, [20]. 
225 Ibid, [30]- [32]. 
226 Typically limited to succession in the UK. (Fincham 2007 (n222) 111). 
227 Winkworth [1980] Ch. 496, 501. 
228 Citing Dicey (9th edn 1973). 
229 Interpretation of good faith exception varies depending on applicable law (Janeen M Carruthers, The 
Transfer of Property in the Conflict of Laws: Choice of Law Rules Concerning Inter Vivos Transfers (Oxford 
University Press 2005) paras 8.45-8.46). 
230 E.g., laws infringing human rights or gross breaches of international law (Pippa Rogerson, ‘Public Policy 
and Cultural Objects’ (2008) 67(2) Cambridge Law Journal 246, 247) as in Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi 
Airways [2002] 2 AC 883; Prominence of public policy doctrine varies across jurisdictions (e.g., more 
prominent in France, Germany than England) (Dicey (n167) 5-004). 
231 Glencore International AG v Metro Trading International Inc (No2) [2001] 1 All ER (Comm) 103; 
Crawford and Carruthers (n167) para 17-15. 
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changing hands and jurisdictions several times. Courts applying the lex situs potentially face 
a conflit mobile, the possibility that more than one potential situs exists.232 Consider the 17th-
century Japanese netsuke under dispute in Winkworth.233 The figurines were stolen from 
Winkworth’s home in England and smuggled to Italy where they were sold to good faith 
purchaser, the Marchese Da Pozza. He consigned them to Christie’s (London) for auction. 
There they were discovered by Winkworth, who lodged a claim of ownership against 
Christie’s and the Marchese.234 The situs of the netsuke at the time of the transfer in question 
was determined to be Italy. Under the Italian Civil Code, good faith purchasers of stolen 
property may acquire ownership if obtained through a transaction able to transfer title if the 
seller were the owner.235 As a result, the Marchese held valid title to the netsuke.236  
 
The principle favoring good faith purchasers is based on the maxim en fait de meubles, la 
possession vaut titre (regarding movable property, possession is equivalent to a title). Civil 
law systems typically acknowledge the title of good faith purchasers over rights of original 
owners as means of facilitating commerce.237 What is considered good faith, or bad faith,238 
as well as requirements such as burden of proof and due diligence vary.239 However, most 
legal systems protect original owners against bona fide purchase in cases of theft to some 
extent, ‘not because of the heinousness of the crime but because […] the owner has not 
voluntarily handed over his moveable to an intermediary and thus facilitated the ultimate 
disposal.’240 For example, France241 and Switzerland242 allow for recovery of lost or stolen 
items within certain timeframes. The distinction is usually made between lost, wrongfully 
sold, and stolen property, varying between jurisdictions. German law, for example, 
differentiates between theft and conversion;243 only theft precludes acquisition in good 
faith.244 Some jurisdictions protect certain objects from being transferred altogether, 
 
232 Symeon C Symeonides, Choice of Law (Oxford Commentaries on American Law 2016) 584. 
233 Winkworth [1980] Ch. 496. 
234 Ibid, 497-499. 
235 Italian Civil Code Arts 1153-1155; Winkworth, 500; Magri (n154) 201. 
236 Winkworth [1980] Ch. 496, 500-514. 
237 Scottish Law Commission (SLC) Memorandum (1976) n.27, Corporeal Moveables 52. 
238 E.g., Swiss Civil Code Art 940 (person possessing object in bad faith must return it to rightful owner with 
compensation for any damage resulting from wrongful possession, subject to no time limits). 
239 E.g., due diligence requirement under 1995 UNIDROIT Art 4(4) for good faith purchasers’ compensation; 
Marc-André Renold, ‘Stolen Art: The Ubiquitous Question of Good Faith’ in Lyndel V Prott (ed), Witness to 
History (UNESCO 2009), 309-313. 
240 SLC Memorandum (1976) n.27, 56. 
241 French Civil Code Art 2277 (three years). 
242 Swiss Civil Code Art 934(1)(bis) (right to recover cultural objects prescribes one year after owner learns 
of location and possessor, maximum 30 years after loss, minus objects res extra commercium.) 
243 Taking of movable with intent to exercise ownership inconsistent with owner’s right of possession. 
244 Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v Elicofon 536 F.Supp 829 (EDNY 1981), 833 (Christa Roodt and David 
Carey-Miller, ‘Stolen Cultural Property: Implications of Vitium Reale in Private Law and Private 
International Law’ (2013) 10(5) Transnational Dispute Management 1, 6-7). 
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regardless of good faith purchase or prescription.245 The Italian Civil Code, as demonstrated 
in Winkworth, is an extreme example leaving no protection for original owners.  
 
Had the Marchese’s purchase occurred when the object was located in England, Winkworth 
could have had a valid claim of ownership under English domestic law, 246 as the principle 
of nemo dat quod non habet (no one can give what they do not have) rules the transfer of 
movable property in England.247 (As well as other typically common law systems.248) This 
is exemplified by the Scots law doctrine of vitium reale, that an inherent defect in title to 
stolen objects cannot be transferred, even to innocent third parties.249 ‘The basic doctrine is 
that theft constitutes a vitium reale which cannot be purged even by sale in market overt.’250  
 
In English law until 1995251 theft was a defect of title only cured in market overt. ‘An ugly 
medieval relic,’252good faith buyers of stolen goods at open market, with no notice of 
defective title from sellers, automatically acquired ownership.253 It does not currently exist 
in common law countries,254 but, in France 255 and Switzerland,256 for example, original 
owners may recover objects purchased at open market upon reimbursement of price paid to 
the possessor. The Italian Code ‘seems to make every vendor a ‘market overt’…if a sale is 
consummated with the proper formalities, the vendee acquires title even though the vendor 
has none to give – in short, a thief can pass good title to a bona fide vendee.’257   
 
 
245E.g., Duc de Frias c Baron Pichon Tribunal Civil de la Seine, J Clunet 1886, 599; Swiss Federal Act on 
the International Transfer of Cultural Property of 20 June 2003, Art 3(2) (registered cultural objects 
belonging to Switzerland are res extra commercium, protection of good faith purchasers excluded).   
246 Slade J. suggested renvoi could theoretically apply, if plaintiff argued an Italian court would apply 
English law (Winkworth, 514). 
247 Sale of Goods Act 1979, Art 21. Common law principle codified.  
248 E.g., US Uniform Commercial Code §2-403. 
249 Todd v Armour (1882) 9 R.901. 
250 SLC Memorandum (1976) n.27, 54; Bishop of Caithness v Fleshers in Edinburgh (1629) Mor. 4145. 
251 Abolished by Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1994 (following market overt sale of paintings stolen from 
Lincoln’s Inn. Lord Renton: ‘Although I am a member of Lincoln’s Inn […] that is not why I am introducing 
the Bill. I should be doing so even if our pictures had not been stolen because, quite frankly, the market overt 
rule has become a thieves’ charter.’ (HL Debate 12 January 1994 Vol.551, 210). 
252 Brian Davenport and Anthony Ross, ‘Market Overt’ (1993) 2(1) International Journal of Cultural 
Property 25. 
253 Sale of Goods Act 1979, formerly s.22(1) (repealed). 
254 David Carey-Miller, ‘Positive Prescription of corporeal moveables?’ (2011) 15 Edinburgh Law Review 
452. 
255 French Civil Code Art 2280. 
256 Swiss Civil Code Art 934(2). 
257 Daniel Murray, ‘Sale in Market Overt’ (1960) 9 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 24, 43. 
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While cases like Winkworth present ‘tales of two innocents,’258 the lex situs rule is neutral.259 
It does not favor any law over another. Per Slade J., ‘It must be accepted that exclusive 
reference to the lex situs must cause hardship to a previous owner in some cases, particularly 
if his goods have been moved to and sold in a foreign country without his knowledge or 
consent.’260  
 
Policy justifications for the situs rule are simplicity, predictability, and commercial 
security.261  While these reasons are important for commerce, they do not adequately protect 
objects of cultural heritage from illicit trade. Excluding the most well-known objects, looted 
cultural heritage is relatively easy to smuggle across borders, conceal until limitation periods 
have passed, and resell.262 Those looking to sell looted or illegally exported items 
(notwithstanding ‘bad faith’ preclusions, such as that in Switzerland, which is not subject to 
any time limit263) are able to take advantage of the situs rule and exploit differences in 
domestic laws relating to movable property, such as statutes of limitations and 
prescription,264 adverse possession (or acquisitive prescription in civil law),265 the demand 
and refusal rule,266 and discovery rules.267 When cultural heritage is illegally removed and 
sold to good faith purchasers in a jurisdiction such as Italy, the object loses protections 
afforded it under domestic laws, and title may be easily ‘laundered’ in a new jurisdiction.268 
Cultural heritage caught in these disputes also lose protections afforded them under 
applicable international conventions. For example, ‘the 1995 Convention does not surmount 
the difficulty that a calculated use of the situs rule by professional traffickers can extinguish 
 
258 Ashton Hawkins, Richard Rothman, David Goldstein, ‘A Tale of Two Innocents: Creating an Equitable 
Balance Between the Rights of Former Owners and Good Faith Purchasers of Stolen Art’ (1995) 64(1) 
Fordham Law Review 49. 
259 Goetschius v Brightman 245 NY 186, 156 NE 660 (1927). 
260 Winkworth [1980] Ch.496, 513. 
261 Ibid, 512 affirming Cammell v Sewell (1858) 3 H&N 617, 5 H&N 728. 
262 Bator (n102); Thomas W Pecoraro, ‘Choice of Law in Litigation to Recover National Cultural Property: 
Efforts at Harmonization in Private International Law’ (1990) 31 Virginia Journal of International Law 1. 
263 E.g., Swiss Civil Code Art 940; Renold (n239) 309-313. 
264 City of Gotha and the Federal Republic of Germany v Sotheby’s and Cobert Finance SA [1998] 1 WLR 
114 (QB) (Roodt and Carey-Miller (n244) 8).  
265 Uninterrupted possession becomes ownership after specified time period; Cassirer v Thyssen-Bornemisza 
Collection Foundation 824 Fed.Appx.452 (9th Cir. CA 2020). Appellate court held Thyssen-Bornemisza 
acquired valid title to Pissarro painting (stolen by Nazis in 1939) by acquisitive prescription, not applicable 
under California law, but applies in Spanish law (the choice of law with most significant relationship). 
(Laurie Frey, ‘Another chapter in the Cassirer Nazi-era saga focuses on choice of law’ (2015) 22(4) 
International Journal of Cultural Property 527). 
266 Cause of action won’t accrue until original owner demands stolen property and good faith possessor 
refuses, which starts owner’s time limit to commence proceedings. An innocent purchaser’s possession 
cannot be wrongful until original owner demands return. (Solomon R Guggenheim Foundation v Lubell 77 
N.Y.2d 311, 569 N.E.2d 426, 567 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1991)).  
267 Actions to recover stolen objects do not accrue until discovery of the object and identity of possessor 
known (Naftzger v American Numismatic Society 42 Cal.App.4th 421 (1996)) (Chechi 2017/18 (n203) 287). 
268 Roodt (n96) 227-228. 
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any benefits bestowed by the Convention. In short, the 1995 Convention cannot prevent the 
sale and purchase of works of art, or other exchange of cultural property, if that is lawful 
according to the law of the situs.’269 
 




Given the disconnect between the treatment of cultural heritage as regular goods in private 
international law and the special status of cultural heritage afforded in international 
instruments and various domestic legislation, some scholars have proposed adopting the lex 
originis, the law of the place of origin of the object under dispute, as the connecting factor 
in lieu of the lex situs for cases relating to cultural heritage.270  The reasoning is that the lex 
originis provides a greater connection to the law of the country most closely connected with 
the heritage under dispute.271 As seen, this was argued for by counsel for Iran in Berend, and 
Eady J. voiced some support, although asserted that it was a matter for governments to 
decide.272 However, to date it has not received much state support. The Institute of 
International Law’s 1991 Resolution273 first advocated for its application. It stated ‘the 
transfer of ownership of works of art belonging to the cultural heritage of the country of 
origin shall be governed by the law of that country,’274 defining ‘country of origin’ as ‘the 
country with which the property concerned is most closely linked from the cultural point of 
view.’275 The conflict rules of Belgium apply the lex originis to cultural heritage disputes, 
however it is the only jurisdiction to do so.276  
 
Given the often complex and meandering journeys of cultural heritage, particularly 
clandestinely excavated objects, it is not always clear which state is the one of origin. 
Consider again the Sevso Treasure (Chapter 1, 1.2.2). Lacking a proven find spot, with three 
nations vying for ownership and 29 modern-day nations within the boundaries of the Roman 
Empire at the date of dispute, it would be difficult, if not impossible for a court to determine 
a lex originis.   
 
269 Carruthers 2005 (n229) para 5.29. 
270 Eric Jayme, ‘Globalization in Art Law: Clash of Interests and International Tendencies’ (2005) 38(4) 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 927, 937.   
271 Derek Fincham, ‘How Adopting the Lex Originis Rule Can Impede the Flow of Illicit Cultural Property’ 
(2008) 32 Columbia Journal of Law & The Arts 111. 
272 Berend [30]. 
273 Institute of International Law, The International Sale of Works of Art from the Angle of the Protection of 
the Cultural Heritage (3 September 1991). 
274 Ibid, Art 2. 
275 Ibid, Art 1(b). 
276 Belgian Code of Private International Law 2004 Art.90; Chechi 2017/18 (n203) 285.  
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States are also reluctant to adopt the lex originis for fear that it would frustrate the rights of 
good faith purchasers. The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention and Directive 2014/60/EU have 
sought to balance the need to protect states of origin and their cultural heritage, as well as 
the rights of good faith purchasers. The instruments have adopted application of the lex 
originis, but allow for payment of compensation to a possessor, if the possessor proves to 
have exercised required due diligence in acquiring the object.277   
 
Most Significant Relationship 
 
Another alternative to the lex situs is the most significant relationship, or closest connection, 
linking the law of the state most closely connected to the dispute. In legal systems preferring 
the lex situs, which is presumed to have the closest connection to the dispute, resort to the 
law of the closest relationship is restricted to cases where the lex situs would lead to an 
inappropriate choice of law, as seen by the exceptions listed to the lex situs in Winkworth.278 
The forum is given discretion to determine the law with the closest connection given 
consideration of relevant factors.279 
 
However, in the United States, most jurisdictions favor the law of the jurisdiction with the 
‘most significant relationship’ according to the American Law Institute’s Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws.280 Absent constitutional restrictions or statutory directives on 
choice of law, a court will consider a number of factors relevant to the choice of applicable 
law and choose the law with the most significant relationship.281  For movable property these 
are, inter alia, the needs of the interstate and international systems, relevant policies of the 
forum, and certainty, predictability and uniformity of result.282 Some states, such as New 
York and California, take a combined approach that considers both the traditional lex situs 
rule and the principles of the most significant relationship approach.283 
 
 
277 1995 UNIDROIT Art 4(4);Directive 2014/60/EU Art 10; Chechi 2017/18 (n203) 285; Szabados (n157) 
334; Renold (n239) 309-313. 
278 Winkworth, 501. 
279 Chechi 2017/18 (n203) 283. 
280 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) governing the rules of contract, tort, and property; 
Symeon C Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution: Past, Present and Future (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 2006). 
281 Restatement (Second) §6 (Choice of Law Principles). 
282 Ibid, §244 (Validity/Effect of Conveyance of Interest in Chattel). 
283 Pecoraro (n262) 8; Symeonides 2016 (n232) 584. 
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Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc284 
provides an illustrative example. The Republic and Church of Cyprus sued to recover stolen 
Byzantine mosaics from Indiana art dealer, Peg Goldberg. She paid (‘$1.2 million reduced 
to $100 bills and stuffed into two satchels’285) and took possession of the mosaics in the 
Geneva airport’s ‘free port’ (outside customs control) and returned with them to Indiana. 
Determining admissibility and applicable law turned on a number of factors, including 
differences in time limitations and good faith exceptions between the three relevant 
jurisdictions, Cyprus, Switzerland, and Indiana. Switzerland was determined to be ‘the place 
of the wrong,’ as Goldberg took possession and control of the mosaics there. However, Swiss 
law was ruled out given its few connections to Cyprus’s action, inter alia, the citizenship of 
the parties in the suit, the transaction, and the ‘fortuitous and transitory’ connections of the 
mosaics to Switzerland.286  
 
The action was deemed admissible under Indiana law, 287 which was held to have the most 
significant contacts to the suit. The court considered, ‘with special attention given to the 
Second Restatement factors,’ inter alia, Goldberg’s residence, financing from an Indiana 
bank, and the mosaics being situated in Indiana.288 This choice of law ‘was to the exclusion 
of the Swiss and Cypriot legal systems, i.e., where the mosaics had been acquired […] and 
where they had resided for over 1400 years […] respectively. […] Ironically […] the court 
reached the correct substantive outcome – the restitution of the mosaics – without applying 
the law of the only State that had the most evident cultural and historical connection to the 
mosaics and hence a truly legitimate claim’289 [of ownership given that the mosaics were 
extra commercium and could not be acquired by a private person under Cypriot law290]. As 
Symeon Symeonides referred to the decision, ‘Right Result, Wrong Law.’291  
 
As seen, use of the most significant relationship does not provide a perfect solution. While 
the Second Restatement is followed by many US jurisdictions, the lex situs still plays a large 
part in determining the most significant relationship. Under the Second Restatement, if the 
most significant relationship to the parties cannot be ascertained or agreed upon ‘greater 
weight will usually be given to the location of the chattel […] at the time of the conveyance 
 
284 Autocephalous 717 F.Supp. 1374 (S.D.Ind.1989); 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir 1990). 
285 Autocephalous 917 F.2d 278, 283. 
286 Autocephalous 717 F.Supp. 1374, 1393-94; 917 F.2d 278. 
287 Autocephalous 917 F 2d 278 (7th Cir 1990), 288-290). 
288 Autocephalous 717 F.Supp. 1374, 1393-94; 917 F.2d 278. 
289 Chechi 2017/18 (n203) 283-284. 
290 Autocephalous 717 F.Supp. 1374, 1397. 
291 Symeon C. Symeonides, ’A Choice-of-Law Rule for Conflicts Involving Stolen Cultural Property’ (2005) 
38(4) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1177, 1182-1183. 
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than to any other contact in determining the state of the applicable law.’292 As Thomas 
Pecoraro stated regarding the validity and effect of conveyance, ‘[d]espite the development 
in the United States of flexible choice-of-law rules capable of responding to policy 
considerations and better able to render a just result, the lex situs rule has survived….’293   
 
2.3 Conclusion  
 
Disputes over cultural heritage engage several areas of domestic and international law and 
policy. They are often factually complex and must balance a range of interests and diverse 
values relating to the heritage under dispute. Nations implement very different policies 
regarding not only the protection and regulation of cultural heritage within their 
jurisdictions, but also the rules that determine those disputes in private international law.   
 
While international instruments contain special rules regarding protections and returns of 
cultural heritage, these are often not applicable, and resort is had to the rules of private 
international law. Most jurisdictions do not have special conflict rules concerning the 
treatment of cultural heritage, and the normal rules governing transfers of movable property 
are applied. When foreign heritage and interests are involved, their significance may not be 
fully understood or accepted by the lex fori or the lex causae.294  
 
Additionally, cultural heritage litigation tends to arise in ‘market states,’ typically Western 
countries concerned with the interests of the commercial art trade.  The primary concern in 
these disputes is the protection of transactions of movable property, allowing for 
predictability and stability in commercial transactions. While this is a reasonable approach 
when relating to ordinary goods and trade, this view strips away the values, be they cultural, 
emotional, or moral, that are inherent to dealings in cultural heritage. Even in a jurisdiction 
with a special choice of law rule concerning cultural heritage, such as Belgium with the lex 
originis, or the move in the United States towards a more flexible, less mechanical approach 
than the lex situs rule, objects of cultural heritage are treated simply as goods to be owned.  
 
What is needed is an approach that considers the welfare and the needs of the cultural 
heritage itself, as well as the communities to whom it is important, taking into consideration 
and respecting the significant cultural values associated with the heritage. The question 
 
292 Second Restatement §244(2). 
293 Pecoraro (n262) 10; Symeonides 2016 (n232) 584-602. 
294 Prott 1989 (n182) 237-238. 
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shouldn’t be to whom does the object belong, but rather, where does the object belong? 
Taking into consideration the specific values relating to certain objects of cultural heritage 




3 Legal Personhood of Cultural Heritage? 
 
 
The rules applicable to cultural heritage disputes are not always aligned with the special 
status afforded cultural heritage in international instruments. While specific rules contained 
in international instruments take into account the special needs of cultural heritage, both 
these and the residual rules of private international law operate on a property paradigm. 
Dealing with recovery claims requires more nuance and ‘complexity both in our thinking 
about, and our remedies to’ these disputes.295  
 
An alternative way of thinking may be to view cultural heritage through the lens of legal 
personhood. For example, standing is a hurdle potential claimants face when demanding 
return of their heritage. As Lyndel Prott posited, an ‘imaginative solution’ to this problem 
would be to attribute legal personhood in order ‘to allow suit by the object itself.’296 The 
cultural heritage would be the subject of legal rights297 with standing to bring suit in its 
name via the agency of human representation. By according cultural objects standing, the 
lex fori might acknowledge the interests of claimants in objects under dispute that might 
not otherwise be recognized, particularly those not based in Western ideas of ownership or 
possession, but on a cultural belonging to a community or a place.298  The emphasis would 
be on cultural heritage as subjects, those with cultural context and value and entitled to 
certain protections, as opposed to goods caught in proprietary disputes.299  
 
Standing is not the only potential consequence. Attribution of personhood could also 
justify a change in connecting factor, from the proprietary lex situs to a potential use of a 
personal connecting factor, such as domicile. While the effects of attributing personhood 
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would likely be limited to municipal law, emphasizing the importance of protecting 
cultural heritage through domestic substantive law, this shift in thinking might help to 
justify the use of alternative means of settling international private disputes for return of 
cultural heritage. This reoriented perspective will be discussed below.  
 
3.1 Legal Personhood 
 
‘Legal persons, being the arbitrary creation of the law, may be of as many kinds as the law 
pleases.’300 Legal personhood is conferred upon whatever or whomever a community 
deems worthy of rights, societal protection, and regulation of its behavior and the behavior 
of others toward it. There may be differing degrees of legal personhood, for example 
‘quasi-person’ status (having partial but not full range of rights) and personhood may be 
restricted or removed for policy reasons.301 From bodies corporate to artificial 
intelligence,302 the attribution of personhood is an accepted legal concept. The recognition 
of foreign legal persons in private international law disputes is procedural and determined 
by the lex fori. Generally, the approach of the English courts is fairly flexible. It is not a 
strict application of the lex fori but takes into account status recognized by foreign law,303 
as demonstrated in Bumper Development Corporation v Commissioner of Police of the 
Metropolis and Ors.304  
 
The attribution of personhood to entities other than humans or bodies corporate is 
increasingly employed in environmental law. A comparison between the treatment and 
protection of cultural heritage and that of the environment is not far-fetched, as discussion 
on cultural heritage preservation has been compared to, for example, non-renewable 
resources and endangered species.305 Certain endangered species have been recognized as 
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legal persons under United States Endangered Species Act.306 Early signs of recognition of 
personhood were promising,307 however standing is now more ambiguous.308   
 
Attributing legal personhood to natural objects was brought to the forefront with 
Christopher Stone’s article, Should Trees Have Standing? Towards Legal rights for 
Natural Objects.309 It was written in an attempt to influence the US Supreme Court’s 
decision in the environmental case Sierra Club v Morton.310 While the Court did not 
endorse the idea, Justice Douglas, referencing Stone, recognized the benefits of conferring 
standing on nature in his famous dissent: 
‘Contemporary public concern for protecting nature’s ecological 
equilibrium should lead to the conferral of standing upon environmental 
objects to sue for their own preservation. […] The river, for example, is 
the living symbol of all the life it sustains or nourishes […] including 
man, who are dependent on it or who enjoy it for its sight, its sound, or 
its life. The river as plaintiff speaks for the ecological unit of life that is 
part of it. Those people who have a meaningful relation to that body of 
water—whether it be a fisherman, a canoeist, a zoologist, or a logger—
must be able to speak for the values which the river represents and which 
are threatened with destruction.311 […]  
The voice of the inanimate object, therefore, should not be stilled. That 
does not mean that the judiciary takes over the managerial functions 
from the federal agency. It merely means that before these priceless bits 
of Americana (such as a valley, an alpine meadow, a river, or a lake) are 
forever lost or are so transformed as to be reduced to the eventual rubble 
of our urban environment, the voice of the existing beneficiaries of these 
environmental wonders should be heard.312 
Perhaps they will not win. Perhaps the bulldozers of ‘progress’ will plow 
under all the aesthetic wonders of this beautiful land. That is not the 
present question. The sole question is, who has standing to be heard?’313 
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As mentioned by Justice Douglas, it is useful to look to personality rights being given to 
rivers and their ecosystems, the number of which have increased in recent years. This 
section will highlight a few examples of the attribution of personhood to rivers by different 
means, via national legislation and judicially, and potential links that might be made in 
attributing personhood to objects of cultural heritage. 
 
3.1.1 Whanganui (Te Awa Tupua)  
 
An influential example is the Whanganui River in New Zealand’s Te Awa Tupua 
(Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017. It is the culmination of nearly two 
centuries of conflict, negotiations, and compromise between the Whanganui Iwi (the Maori 
of the Whanganui River) and the Crown over control of the river and its environment.314 
The act confers upon Te Awa Tupua (the whole of the Whanganui River, including ‘its 
physical and metaphysical elements,’315 Tupua te kawa, ‘intrinsic values that represent the 
essence of Te Awa Tupua’316) ‘all the rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of a legal 
person.’317 It balances the beliefs and practices of the Whanganui Iwi with the interests of 
the Crown, which acknowledged and apologized for injury caused by colonialism.318 
Under the Act, ownership of Crown-owned parts of the riverbed and other lands vest in Te 
Awa Tupua.319 It also created Te Pou Tupua, a guardian body comprised of one member 
nominated by the Whanganui Iwi and another by the Crown.320 With guidance from an 
advisory group,321 the body acts as Te Awa Tupua’s representative with full capacity and 
powers to exercise its rights and duties, including spiritual and cultural rights, and any 
proprietary rights and obligations for land vested in it.322 The Act is silent on the question 
of extraterritorial enforcement.  
 
A criticism of the Act is that it largely functions within the English legal framework and 
Western conception of rights, demonstrated by terminology used throughout.323 However, 
it is fundamentally seen as an innovative instrument that sensitively balances the interests 
 
314 Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017, s.69-70 (Cron Acknowledgements and 
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of both the Whanganui Iwi and the Crown.324 The personhood of Te Awa Tupua is an 
effective tool for recognizing Maori sovereignty and beliefs and facilitating their control of 
Te Awa Tupua within New Zealand’s existing legal framework. While its implementation 
is still fairly recent, thus too early to tell if the attribution of personhood and an appointed 
guardian has aided in the river’s protection, it is an important and significant step, for it 
‘signals a shift from more utilitarian and imperial legal modes towards an appreciation of 
the rights of everything that constitutes the Earth, and in showing that settler societies can, 
and must, forge new identities in ways that honor both their Indigenous and colonial 
histories.’325 
 
3.1.2 Atrato  
 
A similar outcome was achieved judicially in Colombia. In November 2016, Colombia’s 
Constitutional Court (unilaterally) granted legal personhood to the Atrato River in a 
victory for plaintiffs representing indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities living 
along the Atrato in the Chocó Department.326 Years of illegal gold mining caused severe 
environmental damage and a humanitarian crisis.327 The court granted legal personhood to 
the Atrato’s river basin to protect and restore it and its communities. It ordered the creation 
of a commission of guardians to represent the Atrato’s interests, with the local 
communities sharing responsibility for the river’s protection,328 and detailed an 
implementation plan in consultation with the communities.329  
 
In the judgment, Judge Jorge Iván Palacio justified the attribution of personhood with 
reference to ‘biocultural rights’:  
‘the rights that ethnic communities have to administer and exercise autonomous 
guardianship over their territories – according to their own laws and customs – and 
the natural resources that make up their habitat, where their culture, traditions and 
way of life are developed based on the special relationship they have with the 
environment and biodiversity. These rights result from the recognition of the deep 
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and intrinsic connection that exists between nature, its resources and the culture of 
the ethnic and indigenous communities that inhabit them, which are interdependent 
with each other and cannot be understood in isolation.’330 
 
The court based these rights partly on Colombia’s ratification of international treaties,331 
including 2003 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural 
Heritage.332 The bio-cultural argument is significant in that it links protection of 
indigenous and ethnic minority groups and the health of their cultures with the biological 
diversity of the Atrato’s ecosystem. The rights of nature are connected with the rights of 
communities dependent upon river. This case is reflective of a normative shift not only 
regarding environmental protection, but also the need to protect the cultural practices and 
beliefs of the communities that are intertwined with and dependent upon and those 
environments.333  
 
3.1.3 Ganga and Yamuna  
 
A second judicial example was less successful in its outcome. In March 2017, days after 
the Te Awa Tupua Act was announced, the Uttarakhand High Court (UHC) in India 
declared in the surprise ruling Mohammad Salim v State of Uttarakhand and others, that 
the Ganga and Yamuna rivers were ‘juristic/legal persons/living entities having the status 
of a legal person with all corresponding rights, duties, and liabilities of a living person.’334 
Sharma J. declared, ‘Rivers Ganga and Yamuna are breathing, living and sustaining the 
communities from mountains to sea.’335 The rivers, worshipped as goddesses Ganga and 
Yamuna, hold deep significance to Hindus. Millions rely on them for survival. They are 
also highly polluted. The action was brought by a private citizen to, inter alia, address 
pollution and the building of riverbank encroachments after lack of/failed state action.336 
The court emphasized that legal personhood develops out of necessity, ‘subserving the 
needs and faith of society,’337 and decided that attributing personhood was necessary ‘in 
order to preserve and conserve’338 the rivers. 
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Sharma J. referenced the juristic personhood of Hindu idols as recognized in Indian law. 
Properly consecrated idols are viewed as living embodiments of deities inhabiting them.339 
Their interests and property, which may include temples, endowments, and devotional 
offerings,340 are overseen by human managers (shebaits) according to their founders’ 
intentions, but are not owned by the shebaits.341 The Bombay High Court established that 
the pious intentions embodied in Hindu idols entitle them to juristic personality, allowing 
property to vest in them.342 This may extend to temples and other religious institutions.343 
The legal personality of Hindu idols and religious endowments has been described as 
‘something of an oddity in the Indian legal system,’344 and ‘a legal fudge,’ one that while 
‘convenient and flattering to devotees’ was ‘devised by British jurists as a way of getting 
out of the tedious process of sorting out the claims of various Indian parties, with their 
complexities of caste and community practices.’345 Nevertheless, the doctrine is accepted 
in Indian law. 
 
In Salim, the UHC declared a number of state officials ‘as the human face to protect, 
conserve, and preserve the rivers.’346 Sharma J. likened it to the ability of idols to hold 
property and to be taxed through a shebait.347 The court invoked parens patriae, the 
inherent power and authority of the court to ‘uphold the status of rivers Ganges and 
Yamuna and also to promote the health and well-being of these rivers and the Advocate 
General shall represent all legal proceedings to protect the interest of Rivers Ganges and 
Yamuna.’348 However, in contrast to previous examples, very little guidance on 
enforcement was provided. While the Te Awa Tupua Act was the product of several years 
of negotiation and legislative planning, the Salim ruling was ‘a bolt from the blue.’349  
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India’s central government, the Uttarakhand State, and officials appointed as guardians for 
the river petitioned India’s Supreme Court to overturn Salim,350 expressing concerns, 
including potential jurisdictional issues.351 Crucially, the Ganga and Yamuna are 
transboundary rivers flowing through several Indian states, and the Ganga into neighboring 
Bangladesh, raising issues of extraterritorial recognition of personhood and enforcement of 
Uttarakhand judgments regarding the rivers.352 In a press conference, Uttarakhand minister 
Madan Kaushik stated, “Let me be very clear that we are not against according of living 
entity status of the two holy rivers Ganga and Yamuna,” but, “how can the chief secretary 
here be held accountable if the river is polluted in West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand or Uttar 





The attribution of personhood is about deciding what is sufficiently important and worthy 
of protection. In the above-mentioned cases, it was both the river ecosystems and the 
communities dependent upon them. Based on the examples, the attribution of personhood 
seems to have a greater potential effect on substantive domestic law than would be its, 
arguably, more procedural consequences in private international law. The aims are 
attributing personhood to rivers are clear: to protect ecosystems from environmental 
damage, give voice to the communities affected by and intertwined with those 
environments, and reinstate the autonomy of indigenous communities and atone for past 
harms. Personhood as it pertains to environmental cases is instructive in terms of its 
domestic attribution and application. The appointment of clearly designated guardians with 
specific duties is important in order for the aims of legal personhood to function. 
Achieving a balance between the needs of the parties involved in ways that work within 
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existing legal structures also helps to achieve the goals of attributing personhood. The 
involvement and shared responsibility of the communities affected by and dependent upon 
the subjects granted personhood is also important.  
 
While these lessons might be instructive for improving domestic protections for cultural 
heritage, (for example, in demonstrating effective cooperation for the protection of 
heritage, including recognition of cultural practices and beliefs, between governments and 
indigenous communities), extraterritorial recognition and application of legal personhood 
is another matter. The Te Awa Tupua Act is silent regarding international recognition or 
enforcement, and the transboundary nature of the Ganga/Yamuna rivers helped to preclude 
the attribution of personhood altogether. While jurisdictional issues regarding multi-state 
rivers arise, the possibility of a river going too far beyond its state of origin is not relevant 
in the same way as with cultural heritage.  In order to examine potential extraterritorial 
recognition in terms of its use for return claims of cultural heritage, it is necessary to look 
elsewhere.  
 
3.2 Bumper Development and extraterritorial recognition 
 
An example of the recognition of foreign legal entities by the lex fori may be seen in 
Bumper Development v The Metropolitan Police.355 The case provides an example in 
which recognition of foreign juristic persons facilitated the return of an object of cultural 
heritage. The object under dispute was the Pathur Nataraja, a bronze idol of the Hindu god 
Siva, likely part of a religious endowment intended for the twelfth-century Arul Thiru 
Viswanath Temple in Pathur, Tamil Nadu.356 When consecrated, Natarajas are worshipped 
as deities in their own right.357  
 
Buried for centuries, the Nataraja was discovered by a ‘landless labourer’ within the ruins 
of the abandoned temple.358 For five years it passed through a web of underground dealers 
and was sold in London under false provenance to good faith purchaser Robert Borden 
(through Canadian Bumper Development Corporation).359 Prior to export, the Nataraja was 
sent to the British Museum for conservation where suspicions regarding provenance were 
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raised. It was seized by Metropolitan Police ‘with the intention of returning it to its rightful 
owners.’360 Bumper brought a claim in detinue and conversion, an action in tort for 
recovery of wrongfully detained goods, against the Commissioner of Police. The Union of 
India and associated claimants also sought its return. A trial was ordered to determine that 
the idol seized was in fact the Pathur Nataraja (it was), and whether any claimants had 
better title to it than Bumper Development.361 
 
The Union of India withdrew their claim prior to trial. While Union legislation protecting 
national cultural heritage existed,362 no provision allowed assertion of title.363 The Union 
continued to support the action by appointing solicitors and paying associated costs.364 The 
State of Tamil Nadu also claimed the Nataraja under legislation permitting state 
intervention in abuse of religious and charitable endowments, however it was held to have 
no claim.365 Thiru Sadagopan, a public official managing the temple’s interests366 (third 
claimant), the temple (fourth claimant), and the temple’s Sivalingam,367 a cylindrical stone 
embodiment of Siva368 (fifth claimant) were all held to be proper claimants. Thiru 
Sadagopan was able to sue on behalf of the temple as juristic entity according to Tamil 
Nadu law,369 and the Sivalingam, which as a temple idol was considered a juristic entity 
under Indian law.370 Kennedy J. held that the temple and the Sivalingam, juristic entities 
imbued with the pious intention of the twelfth-century founder, proved to be owners with 
superior title to the Nataraja than Bumper.371  
 
Bumper appealed on the grounds that, inter alia, the temple, long defunct, was no longer a 
juristic entity capable of owning property or brining suit for its recovery. Bumper furthered 
that neither the temple nor the Sivalingam were capable of recognition as legal persons 
under English law. The Court of Appeal only considered whether the temple was capable 
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of recognition as a juristic entity in English law.372 Kennedy J., having conducted his own 
research into the question, was reversed on his use of foreign law.373 However, the court 
affirmed that the temple, together with its idols, were juristic entities under the law of 
Tamil Nadu and recognizable as such by the English court, ‘notwithstanding that it was 
incapable of accepting legal personality under English law.’374 Therefore, they were 
capable of bringing suit in English courts through Sadagopan as representative for the 
purpose of recovering religious objects taken from them. The court stated: ‘We emphasise 
that it is essential to our decision that the third claimant, although not himself a competent 
party, is empowered by the constitution of the temple to take all necessary steps in the 
proceedings on its behalf, very much as they would be taken by the next friend or guardian 
ad litem of a minor or patient.’375 The Court of Appeal affirmed that the temple had 
superior title to the idol than that of Bumper Development.376   
 
The Appellate Committee dismissed Bumper’s application for leave to appeal, 377 and the 
judgment against Bumper was recognized and enforced by the Queen’s Bench of Canadian 
Alberta Court.378 The Nataraja was ‘then entrusted to the Indian High Commission in 
London and has since been returned to India.’379  
 
The Court of Appeal confirmed that recognition of foreign juristic entities as parties to 
legal proceedings in England is determined by the lex fori, and that English courts have 
long recognized foreign juristic persons such as corporations established by foreign law 
which would be recognised by English law as having legal personality.380 However, the 
court stated:  
‘The novel question which arises is whether a foreign legal person which would not 
be recognised as a legal person by our own law can sue in the English courts. The 
particular difficulty arises out of English law’s restriction of legal personality to 
corporations or the like, that is to say the personified groups or series of 
individuals. This insistence on an essentially animate content in a legal person leads 
to a formidable conceptual difficulty in recognising as a party entitled to sue in our 
courts something which on one view is little more than a pile of stones.’381  
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As means of assessing the personhood of an inanimate temple that had lain in ruins, 
‘unworshipped for a matter of centuries,’382 the court considered the principles of legal 
personality according to Salmond on Jurisprudence. Per Salmond, legal personality is the 
arbitrary creation of the law and its application may be ‘as many kinds as the law 
pleases.’383   
‘Salmond recognises the possibilities which may not be far-fetched, of (say) a 
foreign Roman Catholic Cathedral having legal personality under the law of the 
country where it is situated; and, in order to make the concept more 
comprehensible, let it be assumed that it is given that personality by legislation 
specifically empowering it to sue by its proper officer for the protection and 
recovery of its contents. It would, we think, be a strong thing for the English court 
to refuse the Cathedral access simply on the ground that our own law would not 
recognise a similarly constituted entity as a legal person. The touchstone for 
determining whether access should be given or refused is the comity of nations 
[…]’384  
 
The court’s recognition of the temple as a party entitled to claim the Nataraja was based on 
comity and deemed not contrary to English public policy, even though it was 
unrecognizable as a juristic entity under English law. The court stated that the decision 
‘avoids the danger of there being any fetter of an artificial procedural nature imported from 
the lex fori which might otherwise stand between a right recognised by and enforceable 
under the lex causae.’385  
 
In Bumper, the recognition of foreign juristic entities resulted in the return of an important 
piece of cultural heritage, one that the Union of India vigorously pursued.386 As Kennedy J. 
stated,  
‘I am sure that the real energy behind the present claim is that of the Government 
of the Union which […] wants to stop, and if possible, reverse, the outward flow of 
a precious part of the nation’s cultural heritage. I do not believe that these claims 
have much to do with the spiritual welfare of the people of Pathur. But I am 
satisfied that the pious intention of the 12th-century notable, who gave the land and 
built the Pathur temple, remains in being and is, personified by the temple itself, a 
juristic entity, which has a title to the Nataraja superior to that of the defendant.’387  
 
Nevertheless, as Richard Davis stated: ‘Modern-day Hindus in southern India, however, 
understood the dynamics of the case differently. As one Tamil Nadu state official put it, “I 
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can only say that Lord Nataraja himself won the case appearing before courts in the form 
of the idol.”’388 While the Union of India supported the efforts to obtain return of its 
cultural heritage, the Pathur community viewed the case as the deity, through the idol, 
genuinely taking itself through the court process. While the Nataraja itself was not a 
claimant or a plaintiff in the case, Bumper demonstrates how domestic establishment of 
legal personhood and its recognition by a foreign forum enabled a community to secure 
return of its cultural heritage.  
 
However, unless personhood is attributed domestically to cultural heritage, and with 
explicit instructions regarding next friend representation or guardianship, the principles in 
Bumper Development are of little use to the settling of international private disputes for the 
return of cultural heritage. 
 




Recognition of certain objects of cultural heritage as legal persons would potentially 
bestow standing to sue for their return through a guardian. This would allow access to 
courts for, e.g., indigenous groups,389 religious communities,390 or individuals otherwise 
unable to raise claims for return based on lack of recognition of personhood or sufficient 
interest.391 While this was demonstrated in Bumper, recognition was entirely dependent 
upon the classification of the temple as a legal person under its foreign domestic law. The 
ruling did nothing to change the standing of other objects of cultural heritage, and the 
Nataraja under dispute was still treated as an object to be owned. Nonetheless, it might 
inspire other courts faced with similar cases to accept foreign objects of cultural heritage 
with legal personhood as proper claimants. If domestic legislation, and perhaps persuasive 
court rulings, clearly establishes what is considered a legal person, combined with explicit 
instructions as to guardianship or representation, this might allow better access to the 
courts for demands for return.  
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For example, the Hopi tribe might have succeeded in their attempts to stop the Parisian 
auctions of their katsinam had the objects themselves been granted standing in French 
courts (Chapter 2, 2.2.1.1). All efforts to halt the auctions were unsuccessful due to 
procedural grounds, most significantly because the French courts held that the Hopi lacked 
legal personality in France,392 irrespective of their federally recognized sovereign status in 
the United States.393 The merits of the tribe’s claim, including provenance information, 
went unaddressed, for their lack of standing barred tribal representatives from bringing a 
recovery action.394 As attorney Pierre Ciric stated: 
‘This dismissive denial of access to justice flies in the face of the 
progress made in international law by all tribes and indigenous peoples, 
as the French government had expressed its support for the legal status of 
indigenous peoples by endorsing the 2007 United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples at the U.N. General Assembly. […] 
Considering that US courts define a foreign citizen’s standing by 
whether his home nation would define his legal capacity, it is shocking 
that France does not grant legal entities under US law the same 
courtesy.’395 
 
Had the katsinam been granted legal standing in the US, the Hopi, with the katsinam as 
claimants acting through a representative, might have been able to halt the auctions and 
had the merits of their arguments heard in a recovery claim. However, as the sovereign 
status of the Hopi tribe was not recognized, and US protections of Native American 
cultural heritage were not considered applicable, it is a stretch to believe that the same 
courts would recognize the standing of foreign objects of cultural heritage. Furthermore, 
even if the katsinam were allowed standing in French court, the matters of proprietary 
rights would still be at issue. The Hopi view religious artifacts, including katsinam, as a 
form of collective property,396 ‘to which French law is generally hostile.’397 Without a 
recognized claim of ownership, the katsinam might have been denied standing due to lack 
of a legitimate claim. In Bumper Development, the Pathur Nataraja was returned to India 
 
392 TGI Paris, interim orders 12 April 2013, RG n°13/25880; 6 December 2013, RG n°13/59110; 27 June 
2014, RG n°14/55733 (see n183); Jonathan Liljeblad, ‘The Hopi, the katsinam, and the French courts’ (2016) 
International Journal of Heritage Studies 1. 
393 1934 Indian Reorganization Act (P.L. 73-383 48 Stat. 984). 
394 Liljeblad (n392) 4. 
395 Pierre Ciric,‘Hopi and Navajo Masks Auction Precedent in France is Dangerous’ (Artnet, 25 July 2014) 
<https://news.artnet.com/market/opinion-hopi-and-navajo-masks-auction-precedent-in-france-is-dangerous-
66975>accessed 02 April 2021. 
396 Derek Fincham, ‘Can the Hopi Thwart the Sale of Sacred Objects in Paris Next Week?’ (Illicit Cultural 
Property, 5 April 2013) <http://illicitculturalproperty.com/can-the-hopi-thwart-the-sale-of-sacred-objects-in-
paris-next-week/>accessed 02 April 2021. 
397 ‘In France, the dominant proprietary model is that of individual property, defined under Art 544 of the 
Civil Code.’ (Marie Cornu, ‘About Sacred Cultural Property: The Hopi Masks Case’ (2013) 20(4) 
International Journal of Cultural Property 451, 458.)  
3 Legal Personhood 63 
because the Hindu temple, according to the law of India, was the owner of the idol and 
therefore held better title than Bumper. While standing would allow potential access to the 
courts for the Hopi tribe through the katsinam, it would not assist in a proprietary claim.  
 
If personhood is granted domestically and recognized by a foreign forum, representative 
standing through a guardian only takes a case so far in terms of adjudicating an object’s 
return and how a forum should treat an object of cultural heritage with standing. For 
example, who is the guardian if not explicitly stated? Who brings the claim? Which law is 
taken to confer standing? What is the connecting factor and how is it determined? Would 
the object own itself and exercise self-ownership, as does the Whanganui River under the 
Te Awa Tupua Act? If so, the cultural heritage under dispute would at once be an object 
and a person, which would not make the situation any clearer.  While most scholarship on 
legal personhood has focused on standing, there are other logical conclusions that would 
follow, such as the use of a personal connecting factor. 
 
3.3.2 Connecting Factors 
 
In addition to standing, the attribution of legal personality raises the question of whether a 
proprietary characterization is correct. Following the logic of personhood to conclusion, 
cultural heritage should not be treated as objects under a proprietary choice of law rule, but 
as persons, akin to the rules applying to status of natural persons and bodies corporate. 
Attribution and recognition of personhood of cultural heritage might potentially justify use 
of a personal law connecting factor as opposed to the lex situs at the time of the relevant 
transaction A personal connecting factor might better connect an object to the community 
to whom it is important, as opposed to focusing on the location of the relevant transaction. 
Such a connecting factor would identify from where the object was removed, allowing for 
the use of a return mechanism to give that state (of origin) priority in the handling of any 
disputes over rights to the object.   
 
Personal status, whether naturally occurring or attributed by application of choice of law 
rules, grants an individual certain rights, capacities, and duties.398 This is not an automatic 
consequence of granting standing to objects but an additional step the law may take. If 
legal personhood were granted to an object of cultural heritage, it might be viewed as a 
type of quasi-person, or a third class of persons (to natural persons and bodies corporate). 
 
398 Elizabeth B Crawford and Janeen M Carruthers, International Private Law: A Scots Perspective (4th edn, 
W. Green 2015) para 10-01. 
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This would entail recognition of the capacity to sue and possibly justify the use of a 
personal law connecting factor in international disputes related to the object. The cultural 
heritage would remain an object, but one with an elevated, special status.  
 
People may be as transient as objects of cultural heritage, becoming subject to the law of 
several jurisdictions over the course of a lifetime. As with the lex situs and determination 
of the applicable transaction for cultural heritage, personal law connecting factors must be 
ascertained at a specific moment, the tempus inspiciendum. The level of transience reacted 
to by personal law connecting factors depends on the connecting factor being employed. 
Determination of an applicable tempus inspiciendum for objects of cultural heritage would 
likely be at the point when an object was wrongfully removed or retained.399 This would 
principally apply to modern-day removals, as application of any provisions indicating its 
use would not likely operate retroactively. Furthermore, historical removals or looted 
ancient objects with no clear find spots, such as with the Sevso treasure (Chapter 1, 1.2.2), 
would raise significant issues of evidence and burden of proof. 
 
The personal connecting factors that could apply are domicile, nationality, and habitual 
residence. Common law domicile, determined according to the rules of the forum, links a 
person to a single body of law with which a person has a significant connection, usually a 
permanent home. Domicile of origin is typically derived from parental domicile, and a 
domicile of choice may be acquired with both change in domicile and an intention to 
remain there for the foreseeable future.400 Nationality links a person to a country and is 
determined by the applicable country. It does not identify a constituent of that country, 
such as a region or a tribe, and a person may have multiple nationalities.401 Habitual 
residence is the state in which a person’s habitual center of interests lies on a stable basis 
and should be determined based on the factual circumstances of a person’s life. Unlike 
domicile and nationality, it reflects a connection to a state rooted in the immediate 
circumstances of a person’s life, as opposed to ties based on origin or lineage.402 Case law 
pertaining to children has shaped the use of habitual residence, particularly relating to the 
 
399 Which would operate similarly to the lex originis rule. 
400 Generally, Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws, Lord Collins of Mapesbury (eds) (15th edn 
Sweet & Maxwell 2012), 6R-001-6-117; Anton’s Private International Law, Paul Beaumont and Peter 
McEleavy (eds) (3rd Edn W Green 2011) 7.13-7.59; Crawford and Carruthers (n398) paras 6-01-6-37; 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws Chapter 2. 
401 Generally, Francesco Salerno, ‘The Identity and Continuity of Personal Status in Contemporary Private 
International Law’ (2018) 395 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 9, 88-93; Crawford 
and Carruthers (n398) paras 6-39-6-41. 
402 Generally, Dicey (n400) 6-119-6-164; Anton’s (n400) 7.60-7.127; Crawford and Carruthers (n398) paras 
6-43- 6-51. 
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1980 Hague Convention in which the habitual residence of the child is the primary 
connecting factor indicating the place where a child is integrated into.403  
 
However, the requirements of these personal connecting factors render them inappropriate 
for objects of cultural heritage. For example, habitual residence is considered the most 
appropriate connecting factor in cases involving children, who depend on their 
environment for stability and care. The needs of objects are different than those of 
children. Basing a wrongfully removed object’s habitual center of interests on its 
immediate circumstances would potentially link it to a jurisdiction completely removed 
from its source community, possibly one with much less favorable cultural heritage 
protections.  
 
Nationality proves problematic in terms of potential instances of dual or multiple 
nationalities. There also exists the risk that states might grant citizenship to objects that 
don’t necessarily ‘belong’ to them as means of retention. If two or more countries claiming 
an object had granted it citizenship, how would a court determine which would prevail, 
particularly as the object could not express any intention or preference? However, this 
would not likely become an issue as states do not often grant objects citizenship,404 which 
would ultimately be an impediment to use of this connecting factor. Furthermore, 
nationality does not identify regions or territories within a country, which would 
significantly disadvantage certain tribal or indigenous claims. Nationality might also link 
an ancient or historical object to a state that did not exist at the time of its creation.  
 
In terms of domicile, the requirement of intention in ascertaining domicile of choice would 
make its application to insentient objects of cultural heritage particularly difficult, unless 
somehow proved by its guardian. Domicile of origin appears to be the closest fit, as it 
would connect an object of cultural heritage to the place from which it originated, perhaps 
a type of domicile derived from the community to whom the object belonged. This, 
however, would pose problems if there is no ‘parental’ community from which to derive 
domicile. Use of this connecting factor would undoubtedly raise issues of bias in favor of 
return. Lastly, application of domicile would produce results similar to that of the lex 
 
403 A v A (Children: Habitual Residence) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre and others 
intervening) [2013] UKSC 60. 
404 However, in 2017 Sophia, a humanoid robot developed by Hong Kong, California, and Amsterdam-based 
companies, was granted full citizenship in Saudi Arabia. (Ugo Pagallo, ‘Vital, Sophia, and Co – The Quest 
for Legal Personhood of Robots’ (2018) 9 Information 230). 
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originis (or the lex situs, depending upon the object’s location at the time of its removal), 
which would arguably be a more appropriate fit.  
 
Given the above, it is ultimately not worth pursuing the use of a personal connecting factor 
in potential instances of cultural objects with recognized personhood.  
 
3.4 Conclusion  
 
As Stone stated in Should Trees Have Standing: ‘What the granting of rights does involve 
has two sides to it. The first involves what might be called the legal-operational aspects; 
the second, the psychic and socio-psychic aspects.’405 Attribution of personhood in the 
river examples originated from the struggles of local communities to protect not only their 
natural resources, but ‘their ethnic and cultural identities [and] the places they hold 
sacred.’406  The substantive effects of the attribution of personhood might be felt internally, 
but the real impact of these decisions are extra-legal, largely rhetorical, and reflective of 
normative shifts. What a community values as worthy of personal status is protected, but 
unless clear domestic law is established and is universally recognized, rhetoric only goes 
so far.  
 
The practical consequences of attribution and recognition of personhood of cultural 
heritage would be title to sue, as well as a potential justification of the use of a personal 
law connecting factor, which might produce results more closely related to the 
communities to whom they are important. However, the attribution of personhood might 
not confer any real legal benefit beyond state borders. Nevertheless, viewing cultural 
heritage through the lens of legal personhood might emphasize the significance of the 
cultural heritage itself, and also the values of the community to whom the heritage is 
important and who demand its return. The granting of personhood solidifies that cultural 
heritage are not mere objects and should not be treated as normal property. The transfer of 
title should not be the focus, rather, the question should be where does the cultural heritage 
belong?  
 
The laws and practices pertaining to cultural heritage vary greatly across jurisdictions. 
They are often culturally specific, making them easy to misconstrue or cast aside. Because 
of this, it is argued that the forum best placed to adjudicate these disputes would not be the 
 
405 Stone (n309) 458. 
406 Kauffman and Martin (n328) 2. 
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court seized (usually where the object is located), but one most closely connected to the 
object under dispute. This is similar to the reasoning behind the 1980 Hague Convention 
and the forum of the habitual residence of the child being best placed to determine any 
custody agreements. The question that is to be answered is where and to whom should the 
object be returned? The analogy of objects of cultural heritage as legal persons might help 




4 The 1980 Hague Convention and a Reimagined Return Mechanism 
 
 
The return of wrongfully removed cultural heritage is vital for its protection.407 The 
primary return mechanisms applicable to cultural heritage, as discussed in chapter two 
(2.1) are detailed in the table below. As they exist, they are under-utilized and limited in 
application. This is mainly due to issues of standing (particularly for private parties), non-
retroactive date of application, and the instruments’ scopes in terms of state accession and 
ratification. Issues of due diligence and payment of compensation are also of concern.  
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407 One of three axes of cultural heritage law: prevention and control, sanction, restitution. (Isabelle Gazzini, 
Cultural Property Disputes (Transnational Publishers 2004) 4). 
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Where these instruments are not applicable, resort is typically had to the residual rules of 
private international law. The treatment of cultural heritage under these rules is 
problematic, the focus being on the latest proprietary transaction, as well as adjudication 
typically taking place in a foreign forum that might not understand the context and 
significance of the object or the laws of its home state. Given this, the need for a 
reimagined return mechanism arises. The discussion of personhood, and the establishment 
of cultural heritage as a special type of property, might benefit the formulation of new 
rules. 
 
Along these lines, there exists a sort of comparison between the treatment of cultural 
heritage and of children under the law. Cultural heritage might be considered as a special 
form of property with particular protections, but it remains property.408 Children are 
considered quasi-persons, protected by others under the law and possessing rights, but not 
full rights. Similar themes in cultural heritage conventions are present in those regarding 
children, such as the importance of domestic measures to protect and prevent wrongful 
removal and trafficking, as well as the necessity to return children unlawfully removed.409 
Viewing cultural heritage through the lens of personhood, of being a type of quasi-person, 
might justify the application of a type of abduction and summary return mechanism 
common to international disputes regarding children. It is insightful, therefore, to look to 
the workings of the summary return mechanism in the 1980 Hague Convention on the 
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.410 
 
4.1 1980 Hague Convention  
 
The objectives of the 1980 Convention are to prevent and deter international child 
abduction411 and to protect children from its harmful effects. The Convention strives to 
achieve these goals through cooperation among contracting states to secure summary 
return of abducted children to their state of habitual residence.412 It is said that the 1980 
Convention413 ‘has been extremely successful. It has resulted in the summary return of 
 
408 Marilyn Phelan, ‘The Unidroit Convention Confirms a Separate Property Status for Cultural Treasures’ 
(1998) 5 Jeffrey S Moorad Sports Law Journal 31, 45-55. 
409 Preamble of, e.g., 1993 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of 
Intercountry Adoption (HCCH 29 May 1993) and Art 21(c); Compare with preambles of 1995 UNIDROIT, 
1970 UNESCO Conventions. 
410 HCCH 25 October 1980 (‘1980 Hague’). 
411 Wrongful removal or retention, in breach of custody rights (1980 Hague Art 3). 
412 1980 Hague preamble, Art 7. 
413 101 contracting parties<https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=24> accessed 
02 April 2021. 
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thousands of abducted children worldwide and deterred the abduction of countless 
others.’414 
 
4.1.1 Return to Child’s State of Habitual Residence  
 
Any person or institution may apply for assistance in securing the return of an abducted 
child415 from a central authority (in the state where the child is located,416 of the child’s 
habitual residence, or that of any other contracting state417). The central authority shall take 
‘all appropriate measures in order to obtain the voluntary return of the child,’418 and in any 
proceedings for the return of a child, ‘[t]he judicial or administrative authorities of 
Contracting States shall act expeditiously.’419  
 
There is an assumption under the Convention that prompt, urgent return of abducted 
children is of greatest priority as it alleviates harm to children caused by their wrongful 
removal or retention. Unless one of the exceptions is established, it assumed that children’s 
best interests are served by automatic return to their place of habitual residence, where any 
substantive custody disputes will be decided.420 Prompt returns are also said to have a 
preventative effect421 in that abductors (typically parents), aware that children will be 
summarily returned to their place of habitual residence, are less likely to unilaterally 
remove children or to breach custody agreements. Furthermore, summary return prevents 
an abductor from being able to choose a new, more favorable forum in which to decide any 
custody arrangements,422 placing the abductor at an unfair advantage over the left-behind 
parent.423  
 
Like Directive 2014/60/EU regarding ownership rights, the 1980 Hague Convention does 
not debate the merits of any award of custody rights424 and emphasizes that ‘a decision 
 
414 Helen Blackburn, Marianna Michaelides, ‘Is it time for the 1980 Hague Convention to be revised?’ 
(Family Law LexisNexis, 7 November 2018) <https://www.familylaw.co.uk/news_and_comment/Is-it-time-
for-the-1980-Hague-Convention--to-be-revised>accessed 02 April 2021. 
415 Habitually resident in a Contracting State prior to abduction (1980 Hague Art 4). 
416 As designated by the Contracting State according to the Convention (1980 Hague Art 6). 
417 1980 Hague Art 8. 
418 Ibid, Art 10. 
419 Ibid, Art 11. 
420 Elisa Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report on the 1980 HCCH Child Abduction Convention, Acts and 
Documents of the Fourteenth Session (HCCH 1980) 430. 
421 Pérez-Vera (n420) 430. 
422 Wrongful retentions of children was complicated after the rule against no unilateral retention was 
abolished (In re R (Children) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre and others intervening) [2015] 
UKSC 35). 
423 Pérez-Vera (n420) 429-430. 
424 1980 Hague Arts 16-17, 19. 
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under this Convention concerning the return of the child shall not be taken to be a 
determination on the merits of any custody issue.’425 In terms of the law chosen to govern 
the initial validity of the claim, custody rights of contracting states are to be respected in 
the courts of other contracting states. 426 Normally, custody disputes are to be determined 
by authorities in the place of the child’s habitual residence upon return, whether based on 
domestic or conflict rules of that state.427 As with Directive 2014/60/EU and ownership 
rights, two proceedings will likely occur – one concerning the return of the child to their 
state of habitual residence and another regarding custody upon the child’s return. 
 
Would the same assumption, that automatic return is in the best interest of children, apply 
to objects of cultural heritage? Under the 1980 Convention, the goals of automatic return 
are to restore abducted children’s status quo as means of protecting their well-being and to 
deter abductions from initially occurring. It cannot be said that the same urgency of return 
exists for a cultural object (although one might consider the standpoint of a bereft 
community), unless there are special instances of, e.g., specific conservation practices that 
are required at the place of origin. Prompt, automatic return, however, might have a 
preventative effect, hopefully discouraging future looting and illegal export, an aim of the 
UNESCO, UNIDROIT Conventions and the EU Directive.428 This would help thwart illicit 
trade in general (illegal sales, illegal exports). Wrongfully removed objects would be 
returned automatically, thus removing any temptation to search for more favorable 
jurisdictions and exploit the differences between legal systems.  
 
4.1.2 Defences Against Return Applicable to Cultural Heritage 
 
4.1.2.1 Settlement Defence 
 
Under the 1980 Convention, return of a child is ordered ‘if a period of less than one year 
has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention.’429 However, the court 
shall order a return even where proceedings commenced after expiration of the one-year 
period, unless it can be shown that a child has become settled in the new environment.430 
This exception leaves room for the fact that return to place of habitual residence prior to 
 
425 1980 Hague Art 19. 
426 Ibid Art 1. 
427 Pérez-Vera (n420) 436, 446. 
428 E.g., Third Report Directive 93/7/EEC, 5 (‘These Member States acknowledge that the Directive has a 
preventative effect and discourages the unlawful removal of objects.’); Maria Schneider, 1995 UNIDROIT 
Explanatory Report (2001), 490 (‘emphasising that its aim to establish “common, minimal legal rules” in as 
many States as possible so as to prevent traffickers from exploiting differences between legal systems.’) 
429 1980 Hague Art 12. 
430 Ibid. 
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abduction would cause more harm than good if a child has become settled. There is no 
guidance provided as to what constitutes settlement. Courts have taken into account several 
factors, such as integration within the community, circumstances surrounding daily life, 
and regard being had to the child’s future circumstances.431 Overall, there is a certain level 
of discretion left to the courts, in which they must weigh the best interests of the child 
against the interest of comity and policy considerations relating to the Convention, namely 
the prompt, automatic return of children.432   
 
A type of settlement defence has also been used to justify the retention of certain objects of 
cultural heritage. As John Henry Merryman posed when speaking about the Parthenon 
Marbles, ‘It is true that they are Greek in origin, but they have been in England for more 
than a century and a half and in that time have become part of the British cultural 
heritage.’433 However, it cannot be said that settlement should be a true defence when 
applied to cultural heritage, particularly when viewed through the lens of the 1980 Hague 
Convention. The best interests of a cultural object are very different than that of children, 
whose health and well-being are greatly affected by changes in routine. The ‘settlement 
defence’ as suggested by Merryman focuses on the community around the objects as 
opposed to the objects themselves. In actuality it is more likely that the truly aggrieved 
community is the one from whom the cultural heritage was originally taken, whereas the 
1980 Hague Convention focuses solely on the best interests of the child. An object might 
be regarded as having settled into its environment, if, for example, it has undergone 
sophisticated conservation or expensive exhibition arrangements have been put in place for 
the object. While these efforts might be viewed as being in an object’s best interest, this 
cannot constitute settlement, particularly if it is contrary to the use or display of the object 
as intended by the community of origin.  
 
4.1.2.2 Grave Risk 
 
Return to a child’s habitual residence may also be refused if it would expose a child to 
grave risk of physical or psychological harm, or an otherwise intolerable situation.434 As 
with the settlement defence, the Convention does not define the risk of gravity required to 
 
431 E.g., C v C [2008] CSOH 42, 2008 SCLR 329, ‘settlement’ is flexible, varies according to individual 
circumstances; Re M (Children) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2007] UKHL 55, [2008] 1 AC 1288, the bar 
for settlement is higher than mere adjustment to a new environment - requires physical establishment in 
community and an emotional component of stability. 
432 Re M (Children) [2007] UKHL 55, [2008] 1 AC 1288, Baroness Hale [40]-[41]. 
433 John Henry Merryman, ‘Thinking About the Elgin Marbles’ (1985) 83 Michigan Law Review 1881, 1915. 
434 1980 Hague Art 13(b). 
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trigger the exception’s application. The degree of gravity required to refuse return varies 
according to specific facts of each case and from state to state.435 Similarly, return may 
also be refused if it would ‘not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested 
State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.’436 In general, 
the Convention strives to balance the priority of return as the best way of preventing and 
protecting children from the harmful effects of international abduction with the 
understanding that certain situations arise in which the unilateral removal of a child might 
serve the child’s best interests.437  
 
A grave risk exception might be triggered regarding return of an object to a country in 
armed conflict, or for objects too fragile to survive removal and transport. Exceptions to 
return do currently exist in the current instruments. For example, the 1954 Hague 
Convention’s First Protocol allows for cultural heritage to be temporarily transferred to 
another contracting party for protection against the dangers of armed conflict, and later 
returned state of origin.438 The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention provides that ‘Resort may be 
had to the provisional, including protective, measures available under the law of the 
Contracting State where the object is located.’439  
 
Perhaps a grave risk exception, similar to that of the 1980 Hague Convention, might entice 
more states to accept a return mechanism. This type of exception for cultural heritage must 
be clearly defined and the threshold for application must be high in order to avoid abuse. 
As means of avoiding exploitation of such an exception, procedures including burden of 
costs for safe removal and transport of objects must be clearly defined, albeit allowing for 
the individual needs of the heritage under dispute.  
 
Fear of object safety in transport is a common argument against return. To use the example 
of the Parthenon Marbles, Merryman posed ‘what reason would there be to expose them to 
the danger involved in removal and transport? [...] The masterpiece is better dismembered 
than destroyed or seriously damaged.’440 As means of assuaging an argument such as this, 
 
435 What is considered grave risk is considered on a factual, case-by-case basis – see recent case concerning 
COVID-19 (held not to be a grave risk; child returned to father in Spain) (Re PT (A Child) [2020] EWHC 
834 (Fam)). 
436 1980 Hague Art 20. 
437 Pérez-Vera (n420) 432; Danielle Bozin,‘The Hague Child Abduction Convention’s Grave Risk of Harm 
Exception: Traversing the Tightrope and Maintaining Balance between Comity and the Best Interests of the 
Child’ (2016) 35 University of Tasmania Law Review 24. 
438 First Protocol, II(5). 
439 1995 UNIDROIT Art 8(3). 
440 Merryman 1985 (n433) 1917,1919. 
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a court in the jurisdiction of return should be able to commence proceedings and adjudicate 
any applicable ownership, etc., rights once an order for summary return has been made 
without the object first being returned. This would prevent unnecessarily transporting a 
fragile object to the state of origin only for it be returned or sent onto a third state. 
Additionally, this would help to alleviate the argument that this type of return mechanism 
is overly biased in favor of return. It can be imagined that, if an object were to be returned 
prior to determination of rights to it, there would be nothing to prevent a state from 
declaring that the object would remain there pending the hearing of the merits of any 
potential ownership claims. The object’s physical presence in the jurisdiction at the time of 
adjudication is not of primary importance. It is about application of the appropriate rules to 
decide the object’s fate.  
 
4.1.3 Possible Undertakings  
 
In addition to a grave risk exception, certain undertakings and their applicability to objects 
of cultural heritage should be considered. 
  
4.2.3.1 Safe Environment for Return 
 
In contrast to the grave risk defence as applicable to the 1980 Hague Convention, there 
should not be requirements regarding use, preservation, or ‘proper’ display of an object 
upon its return, such as a museum waiting to accept the object.441 This is another common 
defence used against the return of cultural objects.442 Greece’s culture minister Lina 
Mendoni, referencing the Parthenon Marbles, had observed, ‘For years, she said, the 
[British] museum had argued that Athens had nowhere decent enough to display Phidias’ 
masterpieces. “It is sad that one of the world’s largest and most important museums is still 
governed by outdated, colonialist views.”’443 The merits of housing or usage of an object 
should be determined by the proper authorities in the state to which an object is returned.  
 
 
441 Cf Brussels II bis (Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental 
responsibility OJ L 338/1, Art 11(4) ‘A court cannot refuse to return a child on the basis of Art 13(b) of the 
1980 Hague Convention if it is established that adequate arrangements have been made to secure the 
protection of the child after his or her return.’ 
442 Merryman 1985 (n433) 1917-1919.  
443 Helena Smith, ‘Greece urges UK to return Parthenon marbles’ (The Guardian, 20 June 2020) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/20/product-of-theft-greece-urges-uk-to-return-parthenon-
marbles>accessed 02 February 2021. However, the British Museum’s Trustees’ statement refutes this, 
arguing public benefit instead. <https://www.britishmuseum.org/about-us/british-museum-story/objects-
news/parthenon-sculptures/parthenon-sculptures-trustees>accessed 01 April 2021. 
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From a cultural internationalist (Chapter 1, 1.2) standpoint, the preservation of cultural 
heritage is of utmost importance. Returns are viewed as detrimental to both the objects and 
to global heritage if conservation and access is not guaranteed. However, objects of 
cultural heritage deserve to be utilized per the purpose of their creation, housed and 
preserved in a manner in which the community sees fit. The fate of an object of cultural 
heritage might not be ‘ideal’ from the viewpoint of the court ordering return. For example, 
the Hopi katsinam are used in religious ceremonies until they are left to disintegrate into 
the earth.444 The requirement of display in a museum would be antithetical to their 
purpose. It would be seen as imprisoning the divine spirits, robbing them of a peaceful 
return to the earth.   
 
Along these lines, it is worth noting the fate of the Pathur Nataraja disputed in Bumper 
Development upon its return: 
‘Responding to a rash of thefts from rural temples, the Tamilnad 
government established the Icon Centre in the 1980s. […] The Centre is 
a vault with two reinforced concrete walls and doors with double locks. 
Armed police guard it round the clock. When the Pathur Nataraja arrived 
in 1991, about a thousand religious icons resided there. […] Safety to 
one, though, can be detention to another. […] The atmosphere inside was 
stifling hot, humid, and stale. The valuable icons were in danger from 
metal fatigue and diseases. [A] reporter called it a “death trap for idols.”  
It is a sad irony that, after so much effort was expended by so many to 
regain the image for India, Tamilnad, and the “pious intention” of the 
twelfth-century donor, the Pathur Nataraja should end up in a concrete 
vault, virtually unworshiped, safe from the international art market but 
now in danger of suffocation and heatstroke. After its difficult life, it 
deserves a better retirement.’445  
 
Even though the outcome might be shocking to many, this is not for the forum in a 
summary return proceeding to decide. It should be determined by the communities, states, 
or individuals most closely connected with the objects acting in their best interests. A 
return mechanism must allow for the ultimate fate of cultural objects to be decided upon 
their return. The basic values regarding the protection and welfare of children are (assumed 
to be) universal. The same cannot be said for those concerning cultural heritage, which are 
culturally and contextually diverse.  
 
 
444 Tom Mashberg, ‘Secret Bids Guide Hopi Indians’ Sprits Home’ (NYTimes, 16 December 2013) 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/17/arts/design/secret-bids-guide-hopi-indians-spirits-
home.html>accessed 31 March 2021. 
445 Richard H Davis, Lives of Indian Images (Princeton University Press 1997) 256-259. 
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However, while an undertaking for an object’s preservation or display should not be a 
requirement, one may be considered concerning to whom specifically the object should be 
returned.  
 
4.2.3.2 Custody  
 
While a parent who has had their child unlawfully removed or retained can be viewed as 
an aggrieved party, it is the child who suffers the most and with whom the 1980 
Convention is primarily concerned. In the context of cultural heritage, while there could be 
damage to the physical object, removal of context, etc, the more clearly aggrieved party 
would be the community from whom the object was taken. They may experience a 
spiritual or cultural loss when deprived of their heritage. Merryman noted, regarding the 
return of the Afo-A-Kom statue to the Kom of Cameroon, from whom it had been stolen, 
‘Return of the object was essential to the well-being of the group, perhaps even to its 
survival… something essential is missing; there is a cultural wound.’446 It is impossible to 
divorce cultural heritage from the human community. The preservation and protection of 
cultural heritage is ultimately for humans - their use, enjoyment, and cultural or spiritual 
enrichment. As Lyndel Prott stated, ‘preservation is sought, not for the sake of the objects, 
but for the sake of the people for whom they have a meaningful life.’447  
 
Any cultural heritage return mechanism would need to consider an object’s protection to a 
certain extent, however, the focus should not be object-centered. Rather, the aim should be 
to determine whether an object was wrongfully removed, taking into account the aggrieved 
party, and ultimately, determining where the object belongs. This would support the 
international view that return of cultural heritage is in the interest of human rights.448 
Summary return would be made to the jurisdiction of the aggrieved party, likely the 
jurisdiction most closely connected with the object. There should be a special provision 
requiring that an object be returned to any community of origin deprived of its heritage 
within the jurisdiction. (Which would most likely correspond with the claimant requesting 
return.) This would be particularly important for indigenous communities within 
jurisdictions, and for instances of states experiencing cultural or actual civil war. However, 
 
446 Merryman 1985 (n433) 1914. 
447 Lyndel V Prott, ‘The International Movement of Cultural Objects,’ (2005) 12(2) International Journal of 
Cultural Property 225, 231; Tolina Loulanski, ‘Revising the Concept for Cultural Heritage: The Argument 
for a Functional Approach’ (2006) 13(02) International Journal of Cultural Property 207, 216. 
448 UNGA Cultural rights and the protection of cultural heritage, Human Rights Council Resolution (22 
March 2018) (A/HRC/RES/37/17)). 
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enforcement might be difficult, as sanctions might prevent states from acceding to any 
instruments requiring them. 
 
4.2 Reimagined Rules for Summary Return 
 
Based on evaluation of the existing cultural heritage return mechanisms, and considering 
the 1980 Hague Convention, some conclusions may be drawn with which to formulate 
better rules for the return of objects of cultural heritage. 
 
Given the highly complex nature of cultural heritage return claims, it is apparent that even 
minimal rules are hard to achieve in order for states to accept them, as demonstrated by the 
UNIDROIT Convention. This leaves individual states with much discretion in terms of the 
instrument’s interpretation and implementation. While this is not necessarily problematic, 
some points must be carefully detailed in order to avoid certain types of claimants or 
objects from being excluded by the return mechanism.  
 
First, standing is always problematic for certain individuals and communities, particularly 
when return mechanisms only allow contracting state authorities to bring a claim. In order 
to make a truly useful summary return mechanism, one that allows for any type of party to 
recover a wrongfully removed cultural object, it must permit a wide range of claimants to 
request return without the necessity of state intervention, similar to the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention regarding claims for stolen objects. As with the 1980 Hague Convention, any 
interested party should be able to request return of an unlawfully removed object, be it an 
NGO acting on behalf of a community or the object itself, an individual, a state, etc. 
Interest in a claim to allow standing must be defined broadly, perhaps along the lines of the 
sufficient interest test for judicial review under English law,449 so as to avoid the overly 
narrow private law test dependent upon ownership.  
 
Second, a broad definition of cultural heritage must be given so that the scope of objects 
covered is wide enough to include as many potential items of cultural heritage as possible, 
such as the definition provided in the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention. Perhaps as an extra 
safeguard, such as a provision allowing the requesting party to establish an object’s 
 
449 The test for standing is ‘sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates’ (Senior Courts 
Act 1981 s.31(3)), which courts have applied with increasing flexibility according to context (AXA General 
Insurance Limited & Ors v The Lord Advocate & Ors [2011] UKSC 46 [170]), ‘so that groups and 
individuals without a direct interest were now more often able to bring judicial reviews in the public interest’ 
(Ministry of Justice, Judicial Review – proposals for further reform: the Government response, February 
2014, 32). 
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importance might be something to consider, taking into account several relevant factors 
such as types of use, spiritual and cultural links, socio-economic factors, etc, which would 
vary on a case-by-case basis. This alleviates the risk that a forum would not recognize the 
special nature of the object, preventing its return.  
 
Third, limitation periods contained in the cultural heritage return mechanisms, as well as 
the instruments’ non-retroactivity, pose problems for certain types of claims, such as 
objects removed during periods of colonialism. In the 1980 Hague Convention, there are 
no official time limitations prescribed in terms of when a party must raise a claim, 
proceedings must commence, or the date by which an authority shall order a child’s 
return.450 While the concept of settlement does function similarly to a time limitation in the 
Hague Convention, the concept of settlement for objects of cultural heritage is not 
particularly relevant. Removal of limitation periods might be something to explore when 
formulating a new return mechanism for cultural heritage. However, doing so might 
prevent states from acceding to the instrument. For example, the UK did not accede to the 
UNIDROIT Convention largely due to ‘the length of the limitation periods in particular, 
and the limited factors which trigger them,’ for they were viewed as too generous for 
potential claimants and unfavorable to possessors who had exercised due diligence.451 
Complete removal of limitations might ignite the all too familiar dissents: ‘The courts will 
be drowned by suits;’ it will ‘lead to the destruction of existing collections;’ it will cause 
‘the destruction of the art trade.’452 The difference between the 1980 Hague Convention 
and the cultural heritage return mechanisms is clear – there are major financial and 
economic factors at play, with pressure exerted from the art trade and other groups looking 
to protect commerce and trade. While removal of any limitation period might be far-
fetched, it is clear from the UNIDROIT Convention and Directive 2014/60/EU that a more 
permissive approach is better suited to cultural heritage.  
 
Fourthly, it should be specified to where an object should be returned, as with the child’s 
habitual residence in the 1980 Hague Convention. The analysis of domicile (Chapter 3, 
3.3.2), particularly a sort of domicile of origin dependent upon/connected to the party 
requesting the object, might be an appropriate fit. This links in a way to the lex originis 
principle, the use of which has been advocated for to determine cultural heritage disputes. 
 
450 1980 Hague Arts 12, 18 (the powers of a judicial/administrative authority are not limited to order the 
return of the child at any time). 
451 ITAP Report December 2000, Department for Culture Media and Sport 49, 50-53. See Chapter 2, 2.1.3 
above.  
452 Lyndel V Prott, ‘The Unidroit Convention Ten Years On’ (2009) Uniform Law Review 215, 217-221. 
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A type of lex originis approach is taken by both the UNIDROIT and Directive 
2014/60/EU, however not entirely – as the law to be used for any subsequent disputes over 
rights to the object will be determined by a forum upon an object’s return. The connecting 
factor might not always be appropriate, however it should be the main factor to consider in 
terms of where an object belongs and where any subsequent disputes should be decided. A 
provision should be included that would require states to return an object to the community 
of origin, which would be particularly relevant in instances of civil war or for indigenous 
communities within the jurisdiction.  
 
A return mechanism should provide the possibility of remuneration for a good faith 
possessor. Like the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention and Directive 2014/60/EU, a due 
diligence requirement placed on the possessor for all objects wrongfully removed must be 
strict as a means of deterring wrongful transfers of objects from happening in the first 
place, as well as avoiding excessive compensation. Compensation should be fair and 
reasonable, not market price or necessarily price paid. As with the UNIDROIT 
Convention, reasonable efforts should be made to hold any transferors of stolen objects 
accountable for compensation. Otherwise, the requesting party will be liable for 
compensation. However, it must be a fair and reasonable price, taking into consideration 
all factors surrounding the object’s removal, circumstances of acquisition, etc.  
 
Lastly, a type of grave risk exception should be included as a means of protecting the 
objects, and perhaps rules for interim protective measures for undergoing claims. 
However, any grave risk exception must be a last resort with a high threshold, as it is likely 
to be abused. There must also be provisions for return transport costs. As with 
compensation for good faith purchasers, it might be useful to consider holding any 
transferors of stolen objects accountable for this. Otherwise, it is most likely that these will 
need to be covered by the requesting party. There should not be any undertakings imposed 
upon the state in terms of proper housing or display. The courts of the jurisdiction granted 
recovery of the object should commence any proceedings over rights to it prior to its 




A revised/reimagined summary return mechanism would hopefully facilitate returns for 
any type of claimant seeking return of wrongfully removed cultural heritage. Automatic 
return of wrongfully removed objects might avoid lengthy and costly return proceedings, 
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as well as provide a preventative effect in terms of illicit removal and trade. Any 
ownership rights should be determined by the receiving state according to their national 
laws, including conflicts laws. These proceedings are likely to be determined by the lex 
situs, as it remains the predominant way to deal with international claims for return. But 
perhaps ‘ownership’ rights and cultural heritage might be seen as analogous with custody 
rights and children, in which there exists a ‘type of jurisdiction which by its nature’453 is 
the most appropriate to determine the dispute.  
 
Take for example, Attorney-General of NZ v Ortiz.454 Had the Maori carving been returned 
to New Zealand, and the dispute over property rights been adjudicated there as opposed to 
in England, ‘the nature of their interest and “ownership” would have raised complex issues 
of native law which would have been dealt with by a special tribunal set up to deal with 
such issues – the Maori Land Court.’455 In this instance, the Maori Land Court would have 
been more appropriately placed to understand the intricacies of Maori conceptions of 
property, the specific roles that cultural heritage play in the community, and ultimately, to 
adjudicate the dispute. 
 
Ultimately, the return of cultural heritage will remain a political question.456 In the absence 
of a completely neutral, international tribunal,457 courts and other authorities will likely 
question the reasoning for returning a cultural object, particularly if there is no clear-cut 
illegality. What are the merits in an argument to send it back? The focus must be on the 
circumstances surrounding removal, as well as the damage caused to the aggrieved party.  
If we look to the treatment of cultural heritage in light of the 1980 Hague Convention, 
viewing cultural heritage as a special type of property that has been ‘abducted,’ there might 
be a greater case to send it back. Upon return, any further disputes over an object will be 
treated in a more appropriate manner based on the particular heritage and the culture to 
which the object belongs. 
 
It is recognized that fundamental incompatibilities exist between child abduction and 
cultural heritage returns. For example, economic motivations play a much larger role in 
 
453 Pérez-Vera (n420) 445. 
454 [1982] QB 349, [1984] AC 1. 
455 Lyndel V Prott, ‘Problems of Private International Law for the Protection of the Cultural Heritage’ (1989) 
217 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 214, 247, 248. 
456 E.g., Maria Shehade and Kalliopi Fouseki, ‘The Politics of Culture and the Culture of Politics: Examining 
the Role of Politics and Diplomacy in Cultural Property Disputes’ (2016) 23(4) International Journal of 
Cultural Property 357. 
457 Alessandro Chechi, ‘Evaluating the Establishment of an International Cultural Heritage Court’ (2013) 18 
Art Antiquity & Law 31. 
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cultural heritage disputes. Financial interests in valuable objects motivate not only the 
parties in a dispute, but also may provoke nationalist or community bias from the courts, 
resulting in unfair dispute resolution and the deterioration of international cooperation. The 
social and cultural contexts surrounding children and cultural heritage also vary. Child 
abduction, on the one hand, is fundamentally a private matter and potential adjudicatory 
bias would not necessarily be linked to the state or community of origin. Disputes over 
cultural heritage, on the other hand, even if presented as proprietary disputes, remain 
essentially public issues. They are potentially bound with nationalist sentiment and bias in 
favor of retention.  
 
The fundamental incompatibilities between contexts ensure that the analogy between child 
abduction and misappropriated cultural heritage cannot be pressed too far. However, while 
the analogy is not a precise one, there are enough similarities to see how the return 








The existing rules applicable to international cultural heritage return claims are 
incongruous with the special treatment afforded cultural heritage, particularly when resort 
is had to the rules of private international law. While return mechanisms currently exist in 
international cultural heritage instruments, they may not apply for a number of reasons. 
This leaves few options for potential claimants other than recourse to private international 
litigation. The rules of private international law typically characterize demands for return 
of cultural heritage as proprietary transactions governed by the lex situs. This framework 
fails to consider the cultural importance, sensitivity, and protections otherwise afforded 
cultural heritage in other areas of law and policy, such as domestically and under the 
international instruments. 
 
An alternative way of thinking about these disputes is to view objects of cultural heritage 
through the lens of legal personhood. This viewpoint places cultural heritage at the center 
of a dispute, including its context and the cultural values of the people to whom the object 
is important. The consequences of legal personhood to objects of cultural heritage, such as 
title to sue, might produce results more closely related to the communities to whom the 
objects are important, yet the personhood analogy is limited. The substantive effects of 
attributing personhood to objects of cultural heritage might be restricted to municipal law, 
however, the true force of attributing personhood is rhetorical. What a community deems 
worthy of legal personhood might gain better protections in its home state, but unless 
personhood is established by clear national law and it is universally recognized, the 
rhetoric only goes so far. For the purposes of private international law, viewing cultural 
heritage through the lens of personhood, as a special type of property with a quasi-
personhood status, allows an analogy to be drawn to the successful return mechanism in 
the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. In 
examining the 1980 Convention and how its rules might apply to returns for cultural 
heritage, improved rules for summary return mechanisms for cultural heritage may be 
envisioned.   
 
While fundamental differences exist between abducted children and misappropriated 
objects, and the social, economic, and cultural contexts and biases vary considerably 
between the two, it is possible that the rules of cultural heritage return could be influenced 
by the mechanism contained in the 1980 Convention. Based on review of the 1980 
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Convention, new rules for cultural heritage summary return would hopefully accomplish 
the following.  They would permit a wide range of claimants to demand return for cultural 
heritage wrongfully removed. The scope of objects covered would be wide and sensitive to 
specific cultural considerations regarding objects under dispute. Any limitation periods 
included would be permissive, and perhaps removed altogether. A type of lex originis 
approach, as seen in the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention and Directive 2014/60/EU, 
specifically of return to a type of domicile of origin connected to the community from 
which the object originated, should be considered.  
 
A revised summary return mechanism would ideally facilitate return for any type of 
claimant seeking wrongfully removed cultural heritage and would avoid long and costly 
return proceedings under the ordinary rules of private international law. Importantly, it 
would allow for any ownership or other type of possessory rights, if applicable, to be 
determined by the courts or other competent bodies in the receiving state. As with the 1980 
Hague Convention, this would be the jurisdiction best placed to determine these rights. 
While these reimagined rules might be aspirational, and perhaps biased in favor of return, 
they lay the groundwork for ways in which to improve existing summary return 
mechanisms.  
 
There are signs that an instrument such as this might be more palatable to states. France 
has agreed to return part of the Parthenon frieze in the Louvre to Athens in exchange for a 
loan of Greek bronzes.458 The National Museum of World Cultures in the Netherlands has 
adopted guidelines for return of artifacts ‘that are of great value to source communities 
regardless of how they were obtained’ with no obligation  ‘to prove that they have a 
suitable museum to house returned objects.’459 A reimagined return mechanism would 
hopefully facilitate the return of wrongfully removed objects to the places and the people 
to whom they truly belong.  
  
 
458 Helena Smith, ‘Boris Johnson rules out return of Parthenon marbles to Greece’ (The Guardian, 12 March 
2021) <https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2021/mar/12/boris-johnson-rules-out-return-of-
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